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Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure
Stephanos Bibas*
Forthcoming 86 N.Y.U. L. REV . (June 2006)
ABSTRACT: The insiders who run the criminal justice
system–judges, police, and especially prosecutors–have
information, power, and self-interests that greatly influence
the criminal justice process and outcomes.
Outsiders–crime victims, bystanders, and most of the
general public–find the system frustratingly opaque,
insular, and unconcerned with proper retribution. As a
result, a spiral ensues: insiders twist rules as they see fit,
outsiders try to constrain them, and insiders find new ways
to evade or manipulate the new rules. The gulf between
insiders and outsiders undercuts the instrumental, moral,
and expressive efficacy of criminal procedure in serving the
criminal law’s substantive goals. The gulf clouds the law’s
deterrent and expressive message and efficacy in healing
victims; it impairs trust in and the legitimacy of the law; it
provokes increasingly draconian reactions by outsiders;
and it hinders public monitoring of agency costs. The most
promising solutions are to better inform crime victims and
other affected locals and to give them larger roles in
criminal justice. It might be possible to better monitor and
check insiders, but the prospects for empowering and
educating the general public are dim.
*
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Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure
A gulf divides the knowledgeable, powerful participants inside
American criminal justice from the poorly informed, powerless people
outside of it. The insiders–the judges, prosecutors, police, and
defense counsel who regularly handle criminal cases–are professional
repeat players who monopolize criminal justice. They come to know
the kinds of crimes, defendants, and sentences that dominate the
justice system. They understand the intricate, technical rules that
regulate arrests, searches and seizures, interrogations, discovery,
evidence, and sentencing and the going rates in plea bargaining. In
short, they are knowledgeable.
Insiders control the levers of power, deciding which cases to
charge, which crimes and defendants deserve probation, and what
prison sentences are appropriate. They reach many of these decisions
in private negotiating rooms and conference calls; in-court
proceedings are mere formalities that confirm these decisions. In an
earlier era, lay juries and the litigants themselves called many of these
shots at public trials. But in a world in which plea bargaining resolves
almost 95% of cases,1 professionals (especially lawyers) run the show.
Insiders also have a distinct set of incentives and practical
concerns. While they may share the public’s intuitions about justice
and retribution, they also have self-interests in disposing of large
caseloads quickly, lightening their own workloads, rewarding
cooperative behavior, and ensuring certainty of conviction and
sentence at the cost of severity. Dealing face-to-face with offenders,
1

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 426 tbl.5.24 (2003) (reporting that in fiscal year 2003, 95.4% of criminal cases
in federal district court that were not dismissed ended in guilty or no-contest pleas), available
at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t524.pdf; id. at 450 tbl.5.46 (reporting that in 2000,
95% of state felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/ t546.pdf. These figures exemplify a trend in recent
decades away from trials and toward pleas. As recently as 1990, only 83.7% of federal
criminal cases that were not dismissed ended in guilty or no-contest pleas. Id. at 423 tbl.
4.22 (chart displaying increasing numbers of pleas and decreasing numbers of trials over the
last few decades), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t522.pdf; see also
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 486
tbl. 5.49 (reporting that in 1992, 92% of state felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas),
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/sb1994/sb1994-section5.pdf. While not
all guilty pleas result from plea bargains, most do.
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they may develop sympathy and see individualized mitigating and
aggravating factors that the public does not. There is also some
evidence that insiders mellow with time, perhaps because repeated
exposure dulls outrage and makes some crimes seem less heinous.2
Outsiders, namely the general public and many victims, have
a very different perspective. To them, the criminal justice system
seems opaque, cloaked in jargon, technicalities, and euphemism and
hidden behind closed doors. Public information about criminal
justice is notoriously inaccurate and outdated, derived from television
and movies whose trials are worlds away from the reality of plea
bargaining. Outsiders have little way of learning about, let alone
participating in, the progress of most pending cases unless a
newspaper publishes a verdict or sentence after the fact. Instead of
participating in jury trials, the public must rely on sensationalist and
often distorted media accounts of atypical, high-profile cases, from
which citizens overgeneralize about the system as a whole. Politicians
seize on these salient examples to whip up popular outrage at what
may be an aberration rather than a trend. Thus, surveys show that
outsiders consistently underestimate the average nominal sentences
for particular crimes and so believe they need to be stiffened.3
Outsiders also do not share insiders’ agency costs, their aversion to
risking acquittals, and their jadedness or mellowing over time.
The result is an enduring tension between self-interested
insiders and excluded outsiders. The insiders have first-hand
knowledge and understanding, run the show, and accommodate their
own pragmatic concerns and self-interests. The outsiders find
criminal justice opaque, run by lawyers, and more concerned with
efficiency and technicalities than with justice.
This tension is far from an absolute dichotomy. Insiders
doubtless bring their senses of justice to bear and not just their selfinterests, and outsiders can at least dimly see some of the practical
constraints on insiders. Moreover, outsiders are not by nature more
harsh or punitive. When surveyed in the abstract, outsiders say they
believe the criminal justice system is too lenient. But when
2

Infra Section I.B.
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confronted with detailed case files, the public is often no more
punitive than insiders,4 apart from the jading or mellowing process
mentioned earlier.
On average, however, insiders are more concerned with and
informed about practical constraints, and they are comfortable with
the tradeoffs and system that they themselves run. Outsiders,
knowing and caring less about practical obstacles and insiders’
interests, focus on process values and offenders’ just deserts. The gap
in information, participation, and self-interests causes insiders’ and
outsiders’ views to diverge. While victims and the public expect
police and prosecutors to represent their interests in a sense, the
groups have markedly different perspectives.
I have previously explored some of the forces that can create
rifts between insider defense counsel and outsider criminal
defendants.5 This essay focuses on different groups of insiders, namely
judges, police, and especially prosecutors, and on different groups of
outsiders, namely victims and the general public. The public, in turn,
comprises locals affected by a particular crime, other residents of highcrime neighborhoods, and the remainder of the general public. These
groups doubtless vary in their interests, knowledge, concerns, and
relative powers.6 For example, residents of high-crime neighborhoods
4

Though “criminal justice professionals and policy makers . . . tend to overestimate
the punitiveness of public sentiment,” in fact “a consistent result from most [sentencing]
studies is that the public is no more severe than judges.” Julian V. Roberts & Loretta J.
Stalans, Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 31, 49 (Michael Tonry ed.,1998); see also Jeffrey A. Roth, Prosecutor Perceptions
of Crime Seriousness, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 232, 235, 238-39 (1978) (finding
suggestive evidence “that those who administer criminal justice may share a view of crime
seriousness with those who are administered by it” and with the general public).
The public might prefer sentences as harsh as the average nominal sentences
specified by insiders, but jaded insiders may nevertheless increase some sentences and
discount others more than the public would like, dispersing actual sentences. See infra
Section I.B.
5

Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2476-80, 2525-26 (2004). Of course, some repeat offenders are more like insiders,
while neophyte defendants are more like outsiders.
6

Victims have the strongest personal interests or stakes in seeing justice done and
in being vindicated or avenged, as well as the greatest knowledge and power under some
states’ victims’-rights bills. Locals affected by a particular crime (“affected locals” for short)
probably have the next-strongest interests in, knowledge about, and power in these particular
(continued...)
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are probably more knowledgeable and personally concerned and so
less like outsiders than the general public as a whole.7 But outsiders
vote and influence lawmaking and law enforcement at the national
and state levels as well as the local level. Thus, one must consider
outsiders in the aggregate as well as how particular subsets or
communities behave and view insiders. Of necessity, the insideroutsider schema elides some complexities and variations, but in return
it highlights important characteristics of each half of the divide.
Insiders control many other parts of government as well,
which is a chronic source of friction in a democracy. As political
scientists have noted, “street-level bureaucrats” in effect make policy
through their low-visibility exercises of discretion in criminal justice
and in many other areas.8 Criminal justice, though, is special. Many
ordinary citizens do not exhibit rational apathy about criminal justice,
but show passionate interest in how insiders handle it. The Sixth
Amendment enshrines public rights to information and participation
in criminal trials, though in practice plea bargaining subverts these
rights. The stakes are high as well: defendants’ lives, liberties, and
reputations compete with victims’ rights, citizens’ security, and the
law’s expressive and moral messages. Also, crime victims, bystanders,
and ordinary citizens have few procedural and no substantive legal
rights in criminal justice. Judges, police, and prosecutors are not
constrained by identifiable clients in the ways that, for example,
teachers and welfare case workers are.9 Thus, the need for and limits
on democratic participation are particularly acute in the criminal
6

(...continued)
cases; after all, they are likely to be witnesses or complainants and may be scared or scarred
by witnessing crimes or narrowly avoiding victimization. Residents of high-crime
neighborhoods are not as directly invested in individual cases’ outcomes, but have more
general personal concerns and knowledge, though they may be a politically powerless group.
Finally, the rest of the general public is likely to have the least direct interest and concern
and only more general forms of power, such as the ballot box. Nevertheless, the general
public does express its outrage and concerns about crime to its elected representatives and
candidates.
7

On the other hand, they may also be even more politically powerless than other
outsiders, which may exacerbate their alienation.
8
9

E.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 3-25 (1980).

Cf. id. at 54-70 (trying but failing to fit police and judges into a model of how
“relations with clients” constrain and shape street-level bureaucrats’ behavior).

2006] Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure

5

arena.
The gulf arises from a combination of procedural and
substantive rules. Most of the culprits are low-visibility procedures
run by insiders, such as arrest, charging, dismissal, plea-bargaining,
and sentencing procedures. But substantive criminal law and policy
also shape the gulf. Outsiders seek to raise sentences, for example,
while insiders may disagree with this substantive policy choice and
subvert it procedurally. In other words, outsiders struggle with
insiders to control substantive policy, while insiders dominate
procedures and so can determine substantive outcomes. Substantive
and procedural rules interact in ways that are obscured by the
academic divide between substantive criminal law and criminal
procedure. This Essay, though it will flag substantive and procedural
forces, hopes to show how they interact.
The gulf between criminal justice insiders and outsiders
impairs the law’s efficacy in many ways. Some of these costs affect
bottom-line substantive outcomes. For example, the gulf may
provoke voters to vote for bumper-sticker sentencing policies, such as
mandatory minimum sentences. It hinders public monitoring of
agency costs as well, leaving insiders too much room to indulge their
own preferences at the expense of outsiders’ interests.
The gulf also inflicts substantive costs that are distinct from
bottom-line sentencing outcomes. It may cloud the substantive
criminal law’s message and effectiveness by making the law too
opaque to deter and express condemnation well. The gulf also
obstructs victims’ vindication, catharsis, and healing of their wounds.
Finally, the gulf imposes procedural costs. It leads insiders to
use subterfuges to subvert democratically enacted laws. It impairs
outsiders’ faith in the law’s legitimacy and trustworthiness, which
undercuts their willingness to comply with it. And it may cloud the
substantive criminal law’s message and effectiveness by making the
law too opaque to deter and express condemnation well. In short, the
gulf impedes the criminal law’s moral and expressive goals as well as
its instrumental ones.
Identifying this tension is the first step toward resolving it.

6
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We cannot return to the eighteenth-century world of public jury
trials, but we can translate its values of publicity and participation
into the twenty-first-century world of guilty pleas. If opacity frustrates
and misleads outsiders, transparency and fuller disclosure can
ameliorate it. For example, we could find better ways to summarize
and publish accurate charging, conviction, and sentencing statistics.
The public, which thinks sentences are too soft in part because it
underestimates nominal sentences, would be more satisfied, perhaps
allaying the impulse to ratchet up sentences. If outsiders feel shut
out, the solution is to give victims and the public larger roles at
charging, plea, and sentencing proceedings. For example, sentencing
circles and other restorative-justice reforms are promising ways to give
victims and other affected locals a voice and a stake.10 Greater
transparency and participation would facilitate monitoring insiders,
checking their self-interests and agency costs. And if deterrence and
social norms theorists want to send messages, criminal procedure must
help to make the messages clear and simple enough to send to
outsiders. (Criminal procedure must try harder to serve these goals
of the substantive criminal law, instead of focusing exclusively on
traditional procedural concerns such as efficiency and procedural
fairness.)11 This is a more charitable way to understand sound-bite
sentencing reforms, such as “three strikes and you’re out,” as efforts
by voters to participate in setting intelligible policies and sending
messages.
10
Restorative justice is an umbrella term for various voluntary, nonadversarial
processes that try to bring together offenders, crime victims, and others to repair the material
and intangible harms caused by crime. For example, victim-offender mediation induces
offenders to speak with their victims face to face about their crimes. Family group
conferences use trained facilitators to encourage discussions among the families of offenders
and victims. Sentencing circles encourage offenders, victims, their friends and families,
members of the community, and criminal justice professionals to discuss and agree upon a
sentence. Community reparative boards are panels of citizens that discuss crimes with
offenders and work out restitution plans. See Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A
Comparison of Four Restorative Justice Conferencing Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at
2-6.
11

I have developed this point in more detail elsewhere. Stephanos Bibas,
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and
Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003); Stephanos Bibas & Richard A.
Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85
(2004).
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Though transparency and participation are no panacea, they
can at least improve this state of affairs by countering misinformation.
Unfortunately, there is a limit to how far these reforms can succeed.
Politicians and the media play to both insiders and outsiders but do
not fit neatly into either camp. The news media and politicians have
incentives to find and exaggerate problems–no one will buy a
newspaper because the headline reads “Crime stays even for third year
in a row.” Stirring the pot wins television viewers and voters, and,
psychologically, people are more ready to generalize from the heartrending example than from dry statistics.
Part I of this essay sketches out the origins and dimensions of
the gulf between insiders and outsiders. It shows how opacity,
domination by insiders, and practicalities such as agency costs
separate the world of lawyers from the world of laymen. Section II.A
explores how these differences create a tug-of-war or rather a spiral,
as insiders set the rules, outsiders react, and insiders undercut the
reactions. Section II.B discusses the harms that result from the lack
of transparency, participation, and monitoring. Part III then turns to
partial solutions, ranging from the legislative process to charging, plea
bargaining, and sentencing. Insiders will always have more
information, more power, and more practical concerns than outsiders,
and the media and politicians will exploit this gap, but reforms can at
least reduce the size of the gap. This essay concludes with thoughts
about how transparency and participation might lead toward reforms
in penology, imprisonment, and alternative sanctions.

I. The Gulf that Separates Insiders from Outsiders
A. What Criminal Justice Looked Like Before the Gulf
Today, few people look back fondly on eighteenth-century
criminal justice. Capital and corporal punishments, such as whipping
and the stocks, were commonplace. Women and minorities were
excluded from a system run by white men. These criticisms, while
important, obscure a key virtue that we have lost: laymen regularly
saw criminal justice at work and took part in it.

8
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Ordinary citizens played large roles in administering AngloAmerican criminal justice in the eighteenth century. As Lawrence
Friedman notes, “[c]olonial justice was a business of amateurs.
Amateurs ran and dominated the system.”12 Lay magistrates, lay
constables, and lay juries ran criminal justice.13 Jurors were prized as
popular local voices who could represent and express “the conscience
of the community.”14 Grand and petit juries were centrally ways of
empowering ordinary citizens to preserve their liberty, express their
sense of justice, and check agency costs and insiders’ self-interest.15
The jury was also a way to educate citizens about the justice system.16
Juries decided guilt in most cases. In practice, they often set
sentences as well by calibrating their verdicts to the punishments that
seemed fitting.17 Until at least the eighteenth century, ordinary
victims prosecuted and defendants defended their own felony cases
pro se.18 Even after defendants gained the right to hire their own
lawyers, most could not afford them and continued to represent
themselves. As a result, trial procedure was unencumbered by
technical rules of procedure and evidence because there were few
lawyers to run them.19
12

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27

13

Id. at 27-30.

(1993).
14

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); accord id. n.15; Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183, 1186-89 (1991).
15

Amar, supra note 14, at 1181-85, 1187-89 (summarizing the point of the Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution); Essays by a Farmer (pt. 4),
MD. GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 36, 37-40
(Herbert J. Storing with Murray Dry eds., 1981).
16

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272-76 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans. 1969) (vol. I, pt. 2, ch. 8) (1835); Amar, supra note 14, at 1186-87.
17

While, strictly speaking, this “pious perjury” was illegal, it was in practice quite
common. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *238; see,
e.g., J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800, at 419-21, 424-29
(1986); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22, 40-41, 52-55.
18
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 10-12 (2003).
Defense counsel did, however, appear more frequently in misdemeanor cases, and public
prosecutors handled treason cases. Id. at 12-13, 36.
19
Even into the first three decades of the nineteenth century, defense counsel
appeared in roughly a quarter of cases and prosecution counsel were even rarer. Id. at 169-70
(continued...)
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The visible, public aspect of trials and punishment was
essential to this scheme. The Sixth Amendment guaranteed local,
public trials, and trials were fast and simple enough that viewers could
understand them. As Akhil Amar has shown, colonists prized public
trials as a safeguard for republican government.20 Public trials helped
citizens to learn their rights and duties, bring relevant information to
court, monitor government agents, prevent judicial corruption and
favoritism, and check witness perjury.21 They also “satisf[ied] the
public that truth had prevailed at trial,” increasing public confidence
in the system.22 Villages were small, and many locals knew the
victims, the defendants, and what was happening in court.23
Punishment on the gallows or in the stocks was a quick and public
affair, indeed a bloodthirsty spectacle, visible to all in the town
square.24 In short, the lay public ran the system and watched the
process and results first-hand. Ordinary citizens and victims would
literally see criminal justice being done.

B. Insiders’ Knowledge, Dominance, and Interests
Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
lawyers supplanted laymen in criminal justice. Public prosecutors
displaced victims, and more defendants began hiring defense
counsel.25 As lawyers’ dominance grew, judges could develop
19

(...continued)
& nn.302, 303 (collecting sources); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea
Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 262-64 (1979)
20

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 112

(1998).
21

Id. at 112-14.

22

Id. at 113.

23

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 23, 25-26.

24

See id. at 26; MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 7-9, 32-69 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). Needless to say, I am not arguing that
these spectacles were on balance desirable, let alone that we should return to the days of
pillories and scaffolds. My more modest point is that the abolition of these punishments and
professionalization of the system have brought with them unnoticed costs.
25
See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 96-97 (2003); FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 67, 70; LANGBEIN ,
(continued...)
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intricate rules of procedure and evidence, further lengthening trials,
cloaking them in legalese, and reducing or excluding laymen’s role.26
Lawyers and judges also developed plea bargaining to avoid these
increasingly lengthy trials and clear their expanding dockets.27 The
effect of plea bargaining was to reduce juries’ roles and hide cases
from public scrutiny. Finally, as capital punishment decreased and
moved inside prison walls, and imprisonment replaced corporal
punishment, punishment became a private, concealed matter
entrusted to experts instead of a public spectacle.28
These trends have created the modern gulf between insiders
and outsiders in criminal justice. Insiders know and understand the
complex legal rules that govern the system and the typical kinds of
crimes, defendants, and punishments.29 Indeed, they structure these
legal rules and informal norms, and they use them to dispose of their
large caseloads.30 They see the witness interviews, police files, and
back-room negotiations that result in plea bargains in most cases. Of
course the insiders’ knowledge is not perfect, as hardly anyone has a
comprehensive view of the system, but these insiders understand and
control at least their own local fiefdoms.
Because insiders spend most of their time working in criminal
justice, they have distinctive perspectives on how to run it. They do
have intuitions about just outcomes, and at first they may share the
25

(...continued)
supra note 18, at 113-36, 169-70 & nn.302, 303. For an interesting look at how lawyers have
stolen victims’ conflicts from them, see Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRITISH J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3-8 (1977).
26

See LANGBEIN, supra note 18, at 171-77, 196, 242-51, 253-310, 319-31.

27

FISHER, supra note 25, at 31, 121-24; Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and
Its History, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 211, 240 (1979); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 11 (1978).
28

See FOUCAULT, supra note 24, at 14-16, 19-22.

29

Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2475, 2481,
2483, 2485. As noted in the introduction, the insiders whom I discuss are the criminal
justice professionals: the most important ones are judges, prosecutors, repeat defense counsel,
and police.
30

Id. For the classic discussion of a related phenomenon, how repeat players use
and develop rules to gain advantages over one-shot litigants, see Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
95 (1974).
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public’s intuitions. But their assessment of just punishment may
soften over time, as insiders become jaded or mellower.31 After one
has seen many armed robberies, for example, unarmed burglaries and
thefts pale in comparison. And while new insiders start out suspicious
of plea bargaining, they grow used to the system and eventually find
it difficult or impossible to imagine any other way.32 Insiders see
defendants individually, up close, which may lead them to consider
aggravating and mitigating factors that the public and victims never
learn about or consider.
Insiders also have practical concerns about huge dockets and
self-interests in disposing of cases. Plea bargains guarantee certainty
of conviction and punishment. In exchange for certainty, risk-averse
prosecutors sacrifice severity to avoid possible acquittals that could
embarrass and hurt their career prospects.33 In addition, judges and
most lawyers have little or no financial incentive to invest extra work
in pending cases instead of disposing of them quickly.34 Indeed,
defense lawyers who receive flat or capped fees can earn more if they
have high turnover.35 The press of large caseloads and limited
funding and support staff also pushes many lawyers and judges to
settle quickly, before investing much work.36 The sooner each
31

See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 119-21 (1978) (describing how prosecutors undergo this
mellowing process). It may also be true that insiders differ systematically from outsiders in
their race, class, sex, culture, and levels of education, and that these differences exacerbate
the gulf between insiders’ and outsiders’ perspectives. I am, however, aware of no empirical
evidence to confirm this claim.
32

Id. at 89-91, 95-99, 117, 148-50, 153-55, 162.

33

Id. at 110-14; Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at
2471-72 & n.26 (collecting sources).
34

Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2471, 2476-77.
Privately retained defense lawyers who charge large hourly rates are an exception to this
generalization, see id. at 2479, but they constitute only a small fraction of the defense bar.
35
36

Id. at 2477.

Id. at 2474, 2479 (discussing prosecutors’ and defense counsel’s incentives to
dispose of their caseloads quickly through plea bargaining); FISHER, supra note 25, at 13, 4049, 121-24 (discussing how funding and caseload pressures encourage prosecutors and judges
to dispose of criminal cases through plea bargaining); see also State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780,
784, 788-90 (La. 1993) (finding the New Orleans public defender system presumptively
ineffective because counsel handled 70 active felony cases at a time, amounting to 418
defendants in the space of seven months, and had inadequate support staff, library, and other
(continued...)
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pending case goes away, the earlier the lawyer or judge can go home
to have dinner with friends and family.37 Swift dispositions mean not
only more leisure time, but also better caseload and conviction
statistics, on which judges and prosecutors assess their performance.38
Of course, lawyers and judges also have non-financial interests in
doing justice, but few can avoid being influenced by finances and
workloads as well.
Another factor reinforces the statistical mindset: legal
training. Many law schools train future judges and prosecutors to use
cost-benefit, net-present-value analysis when assessing outcomes.39
Insiders, facing pressures to be efficient, may think that low-visibility
procedures do not matter so long as ultimate sentences seem
substantively acceptable to them. Most readers of this essay, trained
as lawyers, probably lean toward evaluating bottom-line outcomes the
same way.

C. Outsiders’ Exclusion and Sense of Justice
36

(...continued)
resources; as a result, counsel’s clients entered 130 guilty pleas at arraignment during this
seven-month period); Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An
Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level,
87 IOWA L. REV . 477, 542-44, 552-53 (2002) (finding statistically significant correlation
between federal prosecutors’ workloads and declining federal drug sentences, suggesting that
prosecutors use more-generous plea bargains to dispose of larger caseloads);
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Prosecutors/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 30,
2005) (reporting that in the 2001 National Survey of Prosecutors, 26,425 prosecutors
handled a total of 14,975,073 criminal cases, for an average of 566.7 criminal cases per
prosecutor during the year).
37

Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2471.

38

Id. at 2471 & nn.21-22 (collecting sources); FISHER, supra note 25, at 48-49;
HEUMANN, supra note 31, at 144-48 ; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 106-07 & n.138 (1968).
39

Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 11, at 147; see also Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 107, 111-14 (1994) (describing the standard law-and-economics rational-actor
approach to modeling settlements); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology,
Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 96-101,
121-22, 124 (1997) (empirical study finding “that lawyers are more likely [than lay litigants]
to explicitly or implicitly employ expected financial value calculations when considering
litigation options” and are thus more likely to favor settlement).
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Criminal justice outsiders see the system quite differently.40
Much of the criminal justice system is hidden from their view. Police
understandably do not announce which motorists they will stop and
what crimes and neighborhoods they will target. Prosecutors rarely
explain publicly why they have declined prosecution, pursued felony
charges, or bargained away imprisonment.41 Discovery occurs
between the prosecutor and defense lawyer and is not made public.42
Strict secrecy requirements cloak grand jury proceedings.43 Plea
bargaining usually occurs in conference rooms, courtroom hallways,
or telephone calls instead of open court.44 Important conferences
take place at sidebar or in judges’ chambers. Public jury trials are
rare.45
Even those hearings that are technically open to public view
are in practice obscure. Hearings are often scheduled by conference
call or orders tucked away in dockets, and court clerks do not
publicize schedules. Plea and sentencing hearings are usually mere
formalities that rubber-stamp bargains struck in secret.46 Victims
desperately want information about their cases, and “one of the
greatest sources of frustration to them” is their lack of information.47
40
As noted in the introduction, by outsiders I mean victims, locals affected by the
crime, the general public, and to a lesser extent residents of high-crime neighborhoods. One
might also classify criminal defendants and potential defendants as outsiders, but they are
a special case. Some of them have been through the system often enough to understand it
and should count as insiders. Neophyte defendants are more like outsiders, but their
perspective differs enough from the general public’s that it is simpler to exclude them from
the class of outsiders discussed in this essay.
41

See Department of Justice Authorization and Oversight, 1981: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 1046 (supplemental statement of Assistant
Attorney General Philip Heymann) (“[W]e can’t talk very much about our declinations. . . .
So the public is often not given any detailed information on the reason for a declination;
they simply learn that an investigation of an obvious scoundrel has been closed”).
42

See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (specifying procedures for government disclosures
to criminal defendants and vice versa).
43

E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (federal grand-jury-secrecy rules).

44

See HEUMANN, supra note 31, at 15-16.

45

See supra note 1.

46

See id. at 134, 150-51; FISHER, supra note 25, at 131-33.

47

Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 20-21; see also JO-ANNE M. WEMMERS, VICTIMS
(continued...)
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Though victims’ bills of rights in many states guarantee victims notice
of plea, sentencing, and parole hearings, nevertheless many victims
fail to receive notice.48 Even when they do attend hearings, they have
difficulty understanding them; legalese, jargon, euphemism, and
procedural complexities garble court proceedings. And charge
bargaining divorces convictions from actual crimes so that, in court,
murder becomes manslaughter and burglary becomes breaking and
entering. To outsiders, then, the system seems at best mysterious, at
worst frustrating and dishonest.49 As a result, victims and the public
may lose confidence in and respect for the system.50
The information that the general public does have is often
inaccurate, distorted, or outdated. Unlike insiders, outsiders do not
have a large, representative sample from which they can draw average
or typical cases. Because the justice system is opaque, and most of the
general public has little direct experience with crime or justice, they
must fall back on memorable, unrepresentative, sensationalistic media
accounts.51 Increased media coverage of crime may make crime seem
more frequent, salient, and important, even though crime has
decreased in recent years.52 The media report violent crime and
47

(...continued)

IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

19-20 (1996).

48

PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 36-39 (2001);
Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 11, at 137 (collecting sources). For a discussion of the gap
between victims’ statutory rights and their implementation in procedural rules, see Paul G.
Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Proposed Amendments
in Light of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming).
49

See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1410-12 (2003); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33-34 (2002).
50

See infra Subsection II.B.2. Likewise, criminal defendants believe they have
either cheated justice or gotten bad deals for mysterious reasons, breeding cynicism. See
Wright & Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 49, at 95-96.
51

Lawrence W. Sherman, Trust and Confidence in Criminal Justice, 248 NAT’L INST.
JUST. J. 22, 29 (2002); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 748-49
(2005) (collecting sources). Of course, those with direct experience with crime and justice,
particularly residents of high-crime neighborhoods, do not need to rely on these accounts as
much.
52

For thoughtful discussions of the possible direct and indirect linkages between
media crime coverage and public opinion, see Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects
for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 425-28; Sara Sun Beale,
(continued...)
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unusually lenient sentences, instead of more prevalent minor crimes
and average sentences.53 Many citizens’ sense of criminal justice
comes from movies or television shows that build open-and-shut cases
on forensic evidence and end with swift jury trials.54 That portrait is
anachronistic and ignores the dominance of plea bargaining today.55
Media coverage focuses on atypical cases that go to trial, such as the
Washington snipers (John Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo),
Timothy McVeigh, O.J. Simpson, Michael Jackson, and Martha
Stewart trials. A viewer who watched only these trials might
conclude that most defendants proceed to trial and are convicted
there, unless perhaps they are celebrities who can afford great lawyers.
Media coverage of the Columbine school shooting were enough to
create the impression of a wave of school shootings.56 Politicians
likewise publicize and exploit anecdotes as if they were symptomatic
of trends: witness the sudden explosion of crack-cocaine penalties in

52

(...continued)
What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors
Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 44-51
(1997).
53
Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 51, at 749-50 (collecting sources). The
media on occasion report freakishly harsh sentences as well, but anecdotes of leniency are
more likely to scare and thus attract viewers.
54
See, e.g., CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS television series); L.A. Law (NBC
television series). Apparently, jurors who have seen CSI come to expect air-tight forensic
evidence in every case and “are reluctant to convict” in cases that lack forensic evidence.
Jamie Stockwell, Defense, Prosecution Play to New ‘CSI’ Savvy: Juries Expecting TV-Style
Forensics, WASH. POST , May 22, 2005, at A1; Nat’l Center for State Cts., The CSI Effect,
JUR-E BULLETIN, July 29, 2005, available at http://view.exacttarget.com/?ffcc17
-fe911575756d027574 -fe2c1572736c0575771774; see also Juror Evaluation Forms, U.S. Dist.
Ct., S.D. Ia. (on file with the author) (“Before coming to this court case, I tho’t there had
to be physical evidence . . . to bring a person to trial. I still think that may be the way it
should be.”). More than 61% of those surveyed regularly or sometimes get their information
about the courts from such television dramas, and more than 40% do the same from
television reality shows such as Judge Judy. NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE CTS., HOW THE
PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 19 fig. 7 (1999).
55
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1148-49 (2001).
56

Joel Best, Monster Hype, EDUCATION NEXT, Summer 2002, at 50, available at
http://www.educationnext.org/20022/50.html (describing school shootings as a “phantom
epidemic” and noting that “[i]n large part, media coverage promoted this distorted view of
the problem”).
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response to basketball player Len Bias’s cocaine overdose.57
Collectively, these stories leave outsiders with a memorable but
misleading picture of the kinds of crimes and cases that dominate
criminal justice. The image is one of glamorous, sensational trials in
major cases, not the reality of endless, rapid plea bargaining in myriad
minor cases.
Based on these atypical media accounts, outsiders form
generalized opinions ex ante about crime and punishment in the
abstract.58 Because outsiders no longer participate in criminal justice,
the general public does not see the aggravating and mitigating facts
of individual real cases. When people receive too simple a description
of a crime, they mentally fill in the blanks and base their sentences on
stereotypes or on memorable or recent examples.59 Considering the
actual details ex post, as jurors, would change their perspectives
dramatically.60 For instance, even though 86% of survey respondents
57

In 1986, popular publications such as Time magazine were abuzz about the advent
of crack cocaine. E.g., Jacob V. Lamar Jr., “Crack”: A Cheap and Deadly Cocaine, Is a
Spreading Menace, TIME, June 2, 1986, at 16; Evan Thomas, America’s Crusade: What Is
Behind the Latest War on Drugs, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 60 (cover story); see William A.
Henry III, Reporting the Drug Problem: Have Journalists Overdosed on Print and TV Coverage?,
TIME, Oct. 6, 1986, at 73, 73 (“Crack has dominated media attention during the recent surge
in drug coverage,” including many television, magazine, and front-page newspaper articles).
That June, Boston Celtics draft pick Len Bias died of a cocaine overdose. Congress then
rushed to pass new crack-cocaine penalties in time for the November election. As the bill
wended its way through Congress, politicians kept raising the penalties to prove their
toughness, until the bill provided for 5 grams of crack cocaine to receive the same penalty
as 500 grams of powder cocaine. See David Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1291-97 (1995).
58

See Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 51, at 748-50; see also JOHN DOBLE,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE PUBLIC’S VIEW 14, 16 (1987) (reporting that many focusgroup participants focused on “recent highly publicized crimes,” notably a string of child
murders, and exaggerated the incidence of violent crimes); Loretta J. Stalans, Measuring
Attitudes to Sentencing, in CHANGING ATTITUDES TO PUNISHMENT: PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME,
AND JUSTICE 15, 23-24 (Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough eds., 2002).
59

James P. Lynch & Mona J.E. Danner, Offense Seriousness Scaling: An Alternative
to Scenario Methods, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 309, 311 (1993); see also Stalans,
supra note 58, at 22; Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts About Argument by Hypothetical, 88
CAL. L. REV. 813, 819-23 (2000) (explaining that frequently, hypothetical crime scenarios
are too sketchy and leave respondents to mentally fill in many details relevant to
blameworthienss, which makes it dangerous to generalize from their resulting judgments of
blameworthiness).
60

See Barkow, Adminstering Crime, supra note 51, at 751-52; Rachel E. Barkow,
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favored a mandatory three-strikes statute in the abstract, most
favored one or more exceptions when presented with specific cases.61
Another set of four studies had some respondents read newspaper
accounts of a sentencing and others read court transcripts and the
defendant’s criminal record in the same case. Readers of the
newspaper accounts consistently rated the sentences as more lenient
than readers of the court transcripts did.62
Because the general public has very poor information about
how the criminal justice system actually works, it suffers from
misperceptions.63 In polls, the public says in the abstract that it thinks
that judges sentence too leniently.64 But the general public routinely
underestimates penalties. For instance, most Vermonters surveyed
thought that rapists who wield knives often are not imprisoned. In
fact, in Vermont such rapists definitely go to prison, almost certainly
for at least fifteen years.65 South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia
jurors greatly underestimated how long capital murderers would have
to be imprisoned before being paroled. Perhaps as a result, they
60
(...continued)
Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1283-84 (2005); Edward
Zamble & Kerry Lee Kalm, General and Specific Measures of Public Attitudes Toward
Sentencing, 23 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. SCI. 327, 330-37 & tbl.1 (1990) (finding that when
asked general poll questions, most survey subjects say that the criminal justice system is too
lenient, but when asked to assign sentences for four specific crimes respondents’ sentences
were close to actual sentences, though more severe for breaking and entering and to a lesser
extent for theft).
61

Brandon K. Applegate et al., Assessing Public Support for Three-Strikes-and-You’reOut Laws: Global Versus Specific Attitudes, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 517, 522 tbl.2, 528-30 &
tbl.4 (1996).
62

Indeed, in at least one notorious case, the newspaper readers rated the actual
sentence as too lenient, while the readers of court documents saw the same sentence as too
harsh. Anthony N. Doob & Julian Roberts, Public Punitiveness and Public Knowledge of the
Facts: Some Canadian Surveys, in PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO SENTENCING: SURVEYS FROM FIVE
COUNTRIES 111, 126-32 (Nigel Walker & Mike Hough eds., 1988).
63
Once again, this statement is less true of those with direct experience with crime
and justice, such as residents of high-crime neighborhoods.
64

E.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION: LESSONS
FROM FIVE COUNTRIES 27 (2003); Roberts & Stalans, supra note 4, at 49; see BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at 140-41
tbl.2.43 (2003).
65
JOHN DOBLE RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC. & JUDITH GREENE, ATTITUDES
TOWARD CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN VERMONT: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT AN EXPERIMENT
WITH RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 14-15 & n.5 (2000).

18

New York University Law Review [Vol. 86: p.xxx

returned death sentences.66
In fact, sentences are often as tough as or tougher than the
average citizen would want. For example, in one empirical study,
roughly two-thirds of Illinois residents thought that Illinois judges
sentenced burglars too leniently. Yet when given a concrete burglary
scenario, 89% of them preferred penalties below two years’
imprisonment, the effective statutory minimum.67 Another Illinois
study, involving four hypothetical scenarios, found that judges’
sentences were equally or more severe than laymen’s sentences.68 In
a California survey that gave brief descriptions of six crimes,
respondents preferred sentences as low as or lower than the typical
punishments prescribed by statute.69
Another study found
“remarkable agreement between average respondent sentences and
[federal] guideline sentences.”70 Many other studies find that, when
asked to sentence detailed cases, the public is no harsher or indeed
more lenient than judges.71
This agreement on average sentences conceals troubling
disparities and variations. Prosecutors sometimes raise sentences
above the statutory or guideline minimum by stacking charges or
adding enhancements. In other cases, they use charge or sentence
66

Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1993); Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford
Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death
Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 220-25 (1987); William W. Hood, III, Note, The
Meaning of “Life” for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA.
L. REV. 1605, 1606-07, 1620-27 (1989).
67

Loretta J. Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay
Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing: Misperception and Discontent, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
199, 202 & n.1, 205-07 & tbls. 2, 3 (1990).
68

Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in
Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 75-81 (1989).
69
William Samuel & Elizabeth Moulds, The Effect of Crime Severity on Perceptions
of Fair Punishment: A California Case Study, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 931, 938-40 &
tbl.1 (1986). Indeed, the respondents’ proposed sentences for five of the six crimes (auto
theft, theft of $1000, armed robbery, armed rape, and homicide) appear to be lower than the
sentences prescribed by statute as the middle or normal term. Id.
70

PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES
149 (1997).

AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED
71

JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 210-12 (1997) (collecting sources).
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bargaining to lower real sentences beneath the nominal minimum or
guideline sentences that citizens think appropriate. Outsiders have
little way to review or check these hidden charging and pleabargaining decisions, to determine when harshness or leniency is
appropriate. A particularly lenient plea bargain in one case may
mislead outsiders into thinking sentences are too light across the
board. They may thus push for higher nominal penalties, not realizing
that insiders will apply them inconsistently and use them as
bargaining chips. The result is that arbitrary sentence dispersion
increases, as some defendants receive freakishly high sentences and
others much lower ones.
In short, misperceptions about average sentences fuel spiraling
sentences and discontent with criminal justice. Because the public is
badly misinformed, voters clamor for tougher sentences, three-strikes
laws, and mandatory minima across the board. But this pressure is an
artifact of poor information and ex ante consideration; citizens are not
as reflexively punitive as one might think. The average voter, if fully
informed, would think that the sentences on the books are tough
enough.
Outsiders also want to participate in criminal justice, though
they do not want to take charge.72 More than 75% of victims
surveyed considered it very important to be heard or involved in
charge dismissals, plea negotiations, sentencings, and parole
proceedings.73 Participating makes victims feel empowered and helps
them to heal emotionally.74 More generally, citizens report that
participating in the legal system increases their respect for the system
and empowers them.75
72

See WEMMERS, supra note 47, at 208 (discussing crime victims’ desires).

73

DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS–DOES LEGAL
PROTECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 4 (1998), available at http://ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173839.pdf.
74
75

Strang & Sherman, supra note 47, at 21.

See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 106 (1988) (“The perception that one has had an opportunity to
express oneself and to have one’s views considered by someone in power plays a critical role
in fairness judgments.”); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 163 (1990); Brian L.
Cutler & Donna M. Hughes, Judging Jury Service: Results of the North Carolina Administrative
Office of the Courts Juror Survey, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 305, 311-13 (2001) (reporting that jury
(continued...)
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Because victims, affected locals, and ordinary citizens do not
even know about and understand criminal proceedings, however, they
cannot participate in them. In theory, citizens run grand juries, but
in practice they are dominated by prosecutors and “would indict a
ham sandwich” if prosecutors asked them to.76 In theory citizens run
petit juries, but in practice most cases never make it to jury trials.77
In many states, victims and citizens have no say in decisions to arrest,
to charge, and to plea bargain.78 Even at sentencing, a large majority
of felony victims are absent.79 When they are present, victims at most
read brief victim-impact statements or, more commonly, submit
written statements before sentencing.80 They do not face defendants
and, unlike judges, cannot engage in colloquies with them81 or with
the lawyers. Affected locals and ordinary citizens do not enjoy even
this much participation.
Moreover, outsiders do not fully share insiders’ self-interests
and pragmatic concerns. Victims care only about their own cases,
and they often care passionately. Victims and ordinary citizens do not
care much about maximizing judges’ and lawyers’ won-loss records,
75

(...continued)
service improved the opinions of the justice system of more than 20% of jurors); David B.
Rottman, On Public Trust and Confidence: Does Experience with the Courts Promote or Diminish
It?, CT. REV., Winter 1998, at 14, 19-20 (reporting that criminal court experience increased
people’s satisfaction with the courts); Daniel W. Shuman & Jean A. Hamilton, Jury
Service–It May Change Your Mind: Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 SMU L.
REV. 449, 468 (1992)(reporting that those with jury experience view the criminal justice
system as 11% fairer than nonjurors do); Telephone Interview with the Hon. Robert W.
Pratt, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of Iowa (July 15, 2005) (reporting, based on
empirical data from survey forms returned by ex-jurors, that they consistently gained respect
for the system, learned a great deal, and came away impressed with the importance of their
service).
76

Jim Felman, An Interview with Sol Wachtler, FED. LAW., May 1999, at 40, 45.

77

See supra note 1.

78

DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 201-02, 235-37, 279,
462-64 (1999).
79

TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 48, at 96-98 (reviewing studies). Though, as noted
earlier, a majority of victims want to take part, many victims may be unaware of sentencing
hearings because prosecutors never notify them. Others may decline to attend because the
law gives them inadequate rights to participate; if they are consigned to be powerless
observers, they may see little reason to attend.
80

Id. at 97.

81

Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 11, at 99-100.
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case-processing statistics, profitability, or leisure time. To outsiders,
many of these insider concerns may seem illegitimate and selfish.
They base punishment judgments primarily on their intuitions about
justice, also called retribution or just deserts.82 Outsiders only dimly
glimpse the caseload pressures, underfunding, and risks of acquittal
that induce plea bargains, in part because criminal justice is so
opaque. If they had better information, they might acknowledge
these practical constraints and the need to trade off some severity for
certainty of punishing more offenders. Even so, outsiders probably
would not give self-interest and other practical constraints as much
weight as insiders do. For example, outsiders are probably less risk
averse than prosecutors, who fear that acquittals will result in
personal embarrassment, so outsiders would often not settle as easily.83
And outsiders do not become jaded or mellower as time goes by, as
they do not see the repetitive cycle of cases that desensitize insiders.
Finally, outsiders are laymen, not lawyers. As noted earlier,
insider lawyers focus on bottom-line sentence outcomes.84 Russell
Korobkin and Chris Guthrie’s empirical work, however, finds that
laymen take into account much more than bottom-line outcomes
when evaluating settlements. Lay litigants care about a much wider
82

Roberts & Stalans, supra note 4, at 48; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of
Punishment, 11 S. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 175-76 (2004) (“This study strongly suggests that
punishment judgments are retributive in character, not tailored to consequentialist goals. . . .
These studies indicate that when assessing punishment, people’s judgments are rooted in
outrage; they do not focus solely on social consequences, at least not in any simple way”);
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 237, 240-41
(2000) (“[T]hese studies strongly suggest that intuitive punishment judgments are not
directly tailored to consequentialist goals”); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of
Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 414-19, 472-76 (1999) (arguing that deterrence does not
explain people’s attitudes toward crime and punishment but instead serves as a
rationalization or rhetoric to conceal disagreements rooted in their moral values).
Though most outsiders base their intuitive punishment judgments primarily on
their retributive instincts, the criminal justice system simultaneously tries to serve other goals
as well. See infra text accompanying notes 138, 162.
83

Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2471-72. As
I argued in that article, plea bargaining is far from a rational, efficient market in which
prosecutors seek only to maximize retribution, deterrence, or some other measure of justice.
Many other factors enter into their calculus. Even though fully informed outsiders would
likely acknowledge the need for some plea bargaining, they would likely strike different
bargains because they lack insiders’ self-interests and mellowing over time.
84

See supra text accompanying note 39.
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array of justice concerns than do lawyers, including their own status,
the other side’s blameworthiness, and apologies.85 This approach is
not irrational. On the contrary, it suggests that insiders may take too
narrow an approach when evaluating what factors matter to
outsiders.86 Outsiders care about sentences, but they also care about
a host of process benefits that come from transparency and
participation. Efficiency-minded insiders, however, do little to deliver
these process goods.

II. The Resulting Political Tug-of-War or Spiral
A. The Political Dynamic
In many countries, political elites set criminal justice policy
and have some freedom to ignore the public’s wishes. European
countries, for example, abolished the death penalty in spite of public
opinion rather than because of it.87 Because European governments
are less directly democratic than America’s, European political elites
can resist popular pressure to change criminal justice policies.88 In
85

Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, supra note 39, at 148-50; Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics,
and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, supra note 39, at 99-101, 108-12, 12122, 124, 133-34. Both studies dealt with civil settlements. Richard Bierschbach and I have
argued elsewhere that these concerns are likely to be even more powerful in criminal cases,
because crime victims and offenders have powerful needs to heal, reconcile, learn lessons,
and reintegrate into society. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 11, at 109-18.
86
Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the
Role of the Lawyer, supra note 39, at 129-36.
87

STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 301 (2002);
FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 23 (2003).
88

BANNER, supra note 87, at 301 (noting that European governments were able to
abolish the death penalty in the face of popular support for it because their elected officials
feel less pressure than American politicians do to implement the majority’s preferred
policies); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 13-15, 199-201 (2003) (explaining that the strong
culture of deference to bureaucracies in France and Germany “works both to shield the state
from the [tough-on-crime] pressures of democratic politics and to manage prisons and other
punishments in a sober and disciplined way”); Joshua Micah Marshall, Death in Venice, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 31, 2000, at 12, 13 (explaining that European parliamentary government
makes it harder for upstarts to seize power and for single-issue politics to rock established
party platforms; noting also that political elites dictate these platforms and that elites can
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contrast, America’s political economy is very responsive to popular
pressure, giving organized groups of voters tools with which to
challenge or regulate insiders’ policies.89

Step 1. Insiders’ Procedural Discretion Shapes the
Rules in Action
We start with a system of criminal laws and punishments on
the books. But, in America, the law on the books often is tenuously
related to the law in action, because insiders enforce the law only as
far as they see fit. In other words, they use their wide procedural
discretion to enforce substantive law selectively. As Bill Stuntz
brilliantly argues, criminal laws create not binding obligations but
rather a menu of options for insiders.90 Police need not arrest and
prosecutors need not charge at all, or they can divert defendants to
drug treatment in lieu of punishment.91 When they do charge, they
can often choose from a variety of possible felony and misdemeanor
charges. And when prosecutors do not like the existing rules, they
persuade legislatures to enact more rules to give them more
substantive and procedural options.92 Prosecutors and defense
88

(...continued)
defy popular support for the death penalty).
89
For example, not only do American voters vote for representatives every few
years, but many states also permit them to use ballot initiatives, referenda, and recall
petitions to pass laws directly and discipline elected representatives.
90
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549-58 (2004).
91

Options include declining to arrest, declining to charge, deferring prosecution
pending successful drug treatment or restitution, and post-charge diversion of cases into drug
treatment. Defendants whose cases are diverted may have their charges or sentences
suspended or receive probationary sentences. Many of these options are restricted to or used
most often for minor crimes. Prosecutors decline to prosecute a substantial minority of cases
(between a quarter and a half) and divert a smaller fraction (fewer than 5% of felonies but
more misdemeanors). See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:
CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 798-820 (2d ed. 2003) (collecting sources).
92

See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 533-39 (2001). Stuntz gives two examples: when prosecutors found it too difficult to
prove criminal attempt, legislatures made prosecutors’ jobs easier by criminalizing
solicitation; and when prosecutors found it too difficult to prove burglary, legislatures made
prosecutors’ jobs easier by criminalizing possession of burglars’ tools. See id. at 537-38 &
(continued...)

24

New York University Law Review [Vol. 86: p.xxx

counsel can bargain around most rules.93 For example, they can agree
to forfeitures, civil settlements, or cooperation against other
defendants as full or partial substitutes for criminal punishment.94
Judges have flexibility to dismiss cases, to suggest settlement, and to
hint at light or heavy sentences if the parties go along or refuse to do
so. And parole and good-time credits create flexible gaps between
nominal and real sentences, allowing insiders to set real prison
sentences far below nominal ones.95 These tools are often obscure or
hidden from public view. Even when the public hears about these
tools, it may not grasp their significance.
Unsurprisingly, insiders use these tools in part to serve their
self-interests and other pragmatic concerns. Police avoid arresting
and prosecutors avoid charging (or later dismiss) cases that are
troublesome and not easy to win, such as domestic-abuse cases.96
Prosecutors may decline cases or divert them to drug treatment in
part to limit their workloads. They file multiple initial charges to give
themselves plea-bargaining chips. They may avoid charging
troublesome cases to spare themselves effort, headaches, and possible
acquittals. As discussed earlier, they use plea bargaining in part to
92

(...continued)

n.131.
93

See Nancy J. King, Priceless Process: Nonegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation,
47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 114-15, 118-19 (1999).
94

See id. at 118-19.

95

Right now I am discussing the first step in the spiral, before the public catches on
and reacts. Once the public learns of the pervasive discounting of sentences, it reacts to this
perceived dishonesty by demanding truth-in-sentencing laws and abolishing parole. See infra
Subsection II.A.2. The key point is that the system’s opacity creates a lead time or lag
between insiders’ maneuvers and outsiders’ reactions. At first, that meant that insiders could
be lenient without outsiders’ knowledge. Now, it explains why many citizens still assume
that parole will discount sentences, long after many states and the federal government have
abolished parole. See supra Section I.C (discussing citizens’ systematic underestimation of
actual sentences).
96

At least, police and prosecutors were reluctant to bring domestic-abuse cases
until legislatures enacted shall-arrest and pro-prosecution policies, as described infra
Subsection II.A.4. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB:
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 12-34 (1982); Cheryl Hanna, No
Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1857-65 (1996); Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis
Domestic Violence Experiment, POLICE FOUND. REP., Apr. 1984, at 1-2, available at
http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/minneapolisdve.pdf (last visited July 21, 2005).
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rack up relatively easy convictions and avoid risking embarrassing
acquittals, at the expense of sentence severity.97 They reward speedy
pleas in order to discourage time-consuming motions, extensive
discovery, and protracted negotiations.98 They may be tempted to
push a few strong cases to trial to gain marketable experience while
bargaining away weak ones.99 As noted earlier, defense lawyers may
recommend plea agreements to their clients in part to lighten their
workloads, dispose of cases easily, and earn quick fees.100 They may
even use pessimistic forecasts and slanted assessments to push their
clients toward pleas.101 Judges use their leverage over sentences to
encourage prompt guilty pleas, in effect penalizing trials. By doing so,
they improve their case-processing statistics and avoid timeconsuming jury trials and possible appellate reversal.102

Step 2. Outsiders Try to Check Insiders
In a few respects, some outsiders’ concerns shape insiders’ selfinterests and their exercises of procedural discretion. For example,
most district attorneys are elected and face electoral pressure to
maximize convictions. District attorneys, in turn, push their
unelected subordinates to increase conviction rates. Three things are
noteworthy about this influence: First, it works because voters have
access to a little information (conviction statistics) and participation
at the ballot box.103 Second, it is candidates for office who publicize
this information, as district attorneys or their opponents seize on a few
97

Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2470-72; supra
Section I.B.
98

See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002); State v. LaForest, 665
A.2d 1083, 1085 (N.H. 1995).
99

Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2472-73.

100

Id. at 2476-77, 2479, 2482. But see id. at 2479 (noting that well-paid, privately
retained lawyers may have financial incentives to invest extra work in cases, and that defense
lawyers who volunteer for court appointments may resist pleas in order to gain trial
experience for themselves).
101

Id. at 2525-26; see supra text accompanying notes 35-37.

102

See HEUMANN, supra note 31, at 140-48.

103

Not all of the public can vote. Aliens and convicted felons, for example, may
lack the right to vote, so their voices carry little weight.
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statistics to bring them to voters’ attention. Third, the influence is
imperfect because the information is imperfect. District attorneys can
create the misleading impression of toughness by touting 99.5%
conviction rates, when in fact most of those convictions come from
lenient pleas. Unlike conviction statistics, sentencing statistics are
usually not readily available to the public, so the public cannot check
the bargains being struck.104 District attorneys who push a few highprofile cases to trial and lose may lose their jobs as a result.105 The
upshot is that risk-averse prosecutors plea bargain more than fully
informed voters would like, because voters see only conviction
statistics and not charging or sentencing statistics. Even this
imperfect oversight is limited and sporadic at best, because most of
the system is opaque to outsiders.
Occasionally, an anecdote will capture the public’s attention
and lead to reform. The story of Megan Kanka’s rape and murder by
a recidivist child molester led to a push for sex-offender registration,
for example.106 Sometimes, politicians exploit or exacerbate these
concerns. The Willie Horton advertisement in the 1988 presidential
campaign played on public fears that violent criminals were being
released into their communities too soon.107 Partly in response, many
states restricted or abolished parole.108
104

See Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 38, at 107
(noting that prosecutors measure themselves on convictions rather than sentencing statistics
and that “detailed sentencing statistics are rarely compiled.”).
105

At the very least, visible trial losses give fodder to electoral opponents and
encourage them to run against incumbents. E.g., Andrea Ford, The Simpson Verdicts; The
Prosecution: Another Stumble; The D.A.’s Office Adds to Its List of High-Profile Defeats, Which
Could Leave Gil Garcetti Vulnerable in Next Year’s Election, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A3;
Mitchell Landsberg, Garcetti’s Chances Were Slim, Analysts Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000,
at B1.
106

See www.megannicolekankafoundation.org/mission.htm (last visited July 11,
2005) (recounting how this crime led 400,000 citizens to sign petitions and the New Jersey
state legislature to pass Megan’s Law in “an unprecedented eighty-nine days”).
107

In the 1988 presidential campaign, a political action committee ran a television
advertisement attacking Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis for granting weekend prison
furloughs to convicted murderer Willie Horton. While on a furlough, the advertisement
noted, Horton stabbed a man and raped a woman. A 30-Second Ad on Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1988, at B20.
108
See, e.g., Alexandra Marks, For Prisoners, It’s a Nearly No-Parole World,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 10, 2001, at 1 (noting that many states have restricted and
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Media coverage also fans readers’ and viewers’ crime fears,
provoking public reactions.109 For example, extensive media coverage
of a 1992 carjacking and murder wrongly implied that a carjacking
“wave” was sweeping America.110 As a result, the public clamored for
politicians and prosecutors to create new crimes and penalties. To
take a different example, the 1972 book Criminal Sentences: Law
Without Order exposed the lawlessness of sentencing discretion and
sparked the sentencing-reform movement.111 Liberals worried about
racial and class disparities at sentencing and conservatives inveighed
against lenient sentences by soft-on-crime judges. There was little
hard evidence of the size of the problem, but these concerns resonated
with voters. Thus, many states and the federal government created
sentencing commissions and procedures to make sentencing more
equal and predictable.112

108

(...continued)
thirteen states plus the federal government have abolished parole, and describing this trend
as “the latest chapter in what some criminal-justice experts call the ‘Willie Horton’ effect. . . .
a fear of releasing anyone because the parole board–and the politicians who appoint
them–get blamed if anything goes wrong”).
109

See COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM CRIME RECORDS, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF
POLICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING: A COMPLETE MANUAL FOR POLICE, REVISED 17
(1929) (explaining that accurate crime statistics are necessary because “[i]n the absence of
data on the subject, irresponsible parties have often manufactured so-called ‘crime waves’ out
of whole cloth, to the discredit of police departments and the confusion of the public”).
110
E.g., Alan Farnham & Tricia Walsh, US Suburbs Are Under Siege, FORTUNE,
Dec. 28, 1992, at 42; Bruce Frankel & Dennis Caudron, Young & The Restless, Crime in 1992
More Violent, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 1992, at 7A; Don Terry, Carjacking: New Name for Old
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at A18; see Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,
supra note 92, at 531 & n.108.
111
112

MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972).

For the best account of the sentencing-reform movement at the federal level,
culminating in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 29-77 (1998). At least
eighteen states plus the District of Columbia and the federal government use sentencing
guidelines, and a number of other states are considering enacting them. Richard S. Frase,
State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1190, 1195-96 (2005).
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Step 3: Insiders’ Procedural Discretion Undercuts
Reforms
The result of this sporadic public oversight may be new
substantive crimes and penalties, pressure for increased enforcement,
or a sentencing commission. The public’s attention then fades and
insiders finish drafting, implementing, and administering these new
rules. Sometimes, they implement the rules faithfully.113 But often,
instead of simply being constrained by them, insiders use their
procedural powers to shape and implement these rules in unexpected
ways.114
Some police departments, for example, tout their declining
crime statistics and even use incentive pay to reward officers for
reducing crime. In response, some police officers exaggerate their
performance by misreporting burglaries as larcenies or as lower-value
burglaries.115 To give another example of how insiders use procedure,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines tried to reduce unwarranted
sentence disparity and raised penalties for some kinds of crimes. They
also specified a fixed discount for acceptance of responsibility as the
only permissible reward for guilty pleas in most cases.116 Some
defendants, however, are reluctant to plead guilty and accept long
sentences, so insiders find additional discounts to induce pleas.
Prosecutors and defense counsel agree to conceal or not disclose
113

I am aware of no evidence, for example, that insiders have subverted sexoffender registries by charge-bargaining away child-molestation charges. Child molesters are
subjects of particular public concern, and few prosecutors or judges would want or dare to
go easy on them to clear their dockets. The same is probably true of the most serious crimes
of all, notably clear cases of murder. See Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, supra note 90, at 2563.
114

Cf. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY DO IT 31-110 (1989) (discussing how workloads, peer expectations, bureaucrats’
own beliefs, interest-group pressures, and organizational culture all influence bureaucrats’
behavior and providing examples of counterintuitive regulatory behaviors that result, some
of which seem contrary to the agency’s ostensible mission).
115
116

See LIPSKY, supra note 8, at 167, 233 n.10.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1. (2003). The Supreme
Court has recently struck down the federal Guidelines’ binding force, rendering them
advisory. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-68 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial
majority opinion). Nonetheless, many sentencing judges still give “heavy weight” to the
Guidelines and sentence within them “in all but the most exceptional cases.” E.g., United
States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (D. Utah 2005).
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aggravating facts to sentencing judges.117 They use cooperation
agreements to get around the Guidelines, even in cases where the
proposed cooperation is marginally useful or a fig leaf for a sentence
reduction.118 Prosecutors create new fast-track departures to plead
out large volumes of immigration and drug cases leniently in exchange
for waivers of discovery and other rights.119 Some judges use
downward departures to undercut sentences they think are too
harsh.120 At the same time, by hinting that departures are likely or
accepting plea agreements that provide for them, judges can induce
quick pleas and clear their dockets. Because insiders apply the rules
unevenly, the result is renewed sentencing disparity, as women,
whites, citizens, the well-to-do, and the educated receive lighter
sentences.121 In short, expert insiders learn the complexities of
117

See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 501, 522, 547, 556 (1992); Probation Officers Advisory Group, Probation Officers’
Survey, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 305, 306, 310-11 (1996).
118

See Jeffrey T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four
U.S. District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255, 263-65
& tbl.1 (2005) (reporting that at least one federal prosecutor’s office uses “soft” cooperation
discounts for “information of questionable value” as a tool for reducing stiff sentences).
119
See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 137, 145-48 (2005).
120

For a judge’s remarkably candid admission of this fact, see, e.g., Jack B.
Weinstein, Comment, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 365 (1992) (“[T]he Guidelines . . . have made charlatans and
dissemblers of us all. We spend our time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting,
distorting and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result.”); see also Jack B.
Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 5
FED. SENTENCING REP. 6, 12 (1992) (“One would think that most Americans, judges and
legislators, as well as members of the Sentencing Commission would be embarrassed by this
implacable urge to incarcerate and by the overwhelming desire to ignore the good that people
have done and probably will do. Fortunately, court interpretations of the guidelines are not
always so unyielding. Judges must continue to assume their individual responsibility of
exercising the discretion to depart if sentencing is to approach the levels of fairness and
economy that is required of our criminal justice system.”).
121

See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIED & JOHN H. KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE:
AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE
31 ex.9, 34 ex.12 (1998); Stephen Demuth, The Effect of Citizenship Status on Sentencing
Outcomes in Drug Cases, 14 FED. SENTENCING REP. 271, 273-74 & tbl.2 (2002); David B.
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal
Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 311-12 (2001). Likewise, the victim’s race appears to influence
how insiders exercise their discretion, and in particular what charges prosecutors choose to
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sentencing reforms and exploit their inside knowledge and procedural
discretion. They pursue their own interests in fast, certain
dispositions and their own sense of justice, at the expense of the
reform’s goals of severity and uniform, equal treatment.

Step 4: Outsiders, Egged on by Politicians, Take
Matters into Their Own Hands
Episodically, outsiders hear about these maneuvers and react.
Sometimes these reactions result in procedural restrictions on plea
bargaining and sentencing departures, for instance. At other times,
they give rise to substantive sentencing statutes, such as three-strikes
laws and mandatory minima, or new substantive crimes.
When the public learns of charge bargaining, for example, it
expresses outrage at the sale of justice and the cheapening of crimes
and punishments.122 Sometimes, politicians may capitalize on and
highlight an issue, such as downward departures from sentencing
guidelines. They may please the public by blaming insider judges and
restricting downward departures, as exemplified by the Feeney
Amendment to the PROTECT Act.123 At the same time, politicians
121

(...continued)
file. Offenders who kill white victims, for example, are more likely to be charged with capital
crimes and sentenced to death than those who kill black victims. David C. Baldus et al.,
Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal
Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1659-60 (1998);
David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital
Punishment: Reflections on Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1423-26 (2004).
122

See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 25, at 148-52; see also Wright & Miller, The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 49, at 96 (noting that charge bargaining disappoints
the public’s expectations and creates a feeling of “learned helplessness”); Laura B. Myers,
Bringing the Offender to Heel: Views of the Criminal Courts, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 46, 49, 54-55 & tbl.4.2 (Timothy J.
Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (reporting multiple surveys that found that the
public dislikes plea bargaining).
123
S. 151, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (2003) (enacted). The Feeney Amendment
restricted sentencing judges’ ability to lower sentences unilaterally under the federal
Sentencing Guidelines. It did so by eliminating or restricting many permissible grounds for
downward departures, requiring prosecutorial assent to several downward adjustments, and
increasing appellate, executive, and legislative scrutiny of downward departures. See generally
Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea
(continued...)
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cater to prosecutors, a powerful insider constituency.124 Thus, the
Feeney Amendment left most prosecutor-initiated departures alone,
approved of but capped fast-track departures, and gave prosecutors
extra bargaining chips.125 In other words, Congress did a deft job of
catering to outsider outrage and insider interests simultaneously.126
Legislatures do the same thing by passing mandatoryminimum sentencing laws for drug trafficking, gun crimes, and other
high-profile crimes.127 These laws satisfy outsiders’ desire to bind
judges and clamp down on leniency while, in effect, giving insider
prosecutors more tools and charging options.
Occasionally, however, legislatures side with outsiders in
restricting prosecutorial discretion. In New York State, the 1973
Rockefeller drug laws greatly restricted prosecutors’ ability to plea
bargain away mandatory drug sentences.128 Legislatures also restrict
police and prosecutorial leniency involving politically salient crimes.
In domestic-abuse cases, for example, legislatures passed shall-arrest
and no-drop policies to change police and prosecutors’ traditional
reluctance to arrest and willingness to drop charges.129 Candidates for
office may also raise these issues by campaigning as outsiders against
123
(...continued)
Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004) (explaining these and other provisions).
124

See Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 92, at 529-38,

544-46.
125

See Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power
to Plea Bargain, supra note 123, at 296, 299-301.
126

Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 104-29 (2004) (arguing that Congress keeps broadening
corporate criminal liability to show the public that it is doing something and to give
prosecutors tools with which to win convictions more easily, and that corporations actually
prefer this response to broadened civil liability).
127

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (prescribing mandatory five-year consecutive
sentence for anyone who “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime”); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (B) (2000 & Supp.
2002) (prescribing five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking in certain
quantities of drugs).
128
129

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 220.10 (McKinney 2005).

E.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.2901 (West Supp. 1997) (establishing “a pro-prosecution
policy” and special prosecutorial units for domestic abuse and empowering prosecutors to
proceed even over the victim’s objection); WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (West 1998); see Hanna,
supra note 96, at 1857-65.

32

New York University Law Review [Vol. 86: p.xxx

the abuses of insiders. For example, in New Orleans, Harry Connick,
Sr. unseated District Attorney Jim Garrison by criticizing rampant
plea bargaining and promising to clamp down.130
Outsiders sometimes take matters into their own hands and
use direct democracy to circumvent legislatures. In California, for
example, voters used a ballot initiative to pass a law banning plea
bargaining in cases whose indictments or informations charge
specified serious crimes.131 Also in California, voters put a tough
three-strikes-and-you’re-out initiative on the ballot, mandating
fifteen-year minimum sentences for three-time felons.132 The
legislature had buried the bill in committee, but then twelve-year-old
Polly Klaas was kidnapped, molested, and murdered. In the wake of
this heinous crime, a total of 840,000 people signed petitions to put
the initiative on the ballot. Bowing to this pressure, the legislature
passed the law.133
Many commentators criticize mandatory-sentencing laws as
expressing the public’s bloodthirsty desire for ever more punishment.
Some denigrate these laws as no more than sound-bite sentencing
slogans.134 These laws also express voters’ concern about the decay of
social and moral cohesion.135 But in addition, there is another,
charitable way to understand mandatory laws, particularly initiatives
and referenda. The public is frustrated by the criminal justice system.
130

See Wright & Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 49, at 61.
Connick is the father of the famous singer Harry Connick, Jr.
131
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 2004). See generally CANDACE MCCOY,
POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (1993) (discussing the
enactment, purposes, and scope of this initiative).
132

CAL PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 1999).

133

Richard Kelly Heft, Legislating with a Vengeance: Criminals in California Now Face
Life Sentences After Their Third Offence Under the “Three Strikes, You’re Out” Law,
INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 26, 1995, at 27.
134

See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Tough Crime Laws Are False Promises, 7 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 61, 62 (1994); Symposium, Juvenile Justice: Reform After One-Hundred
Years, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1409, 1414-15 (2000) (remarks of Congressman Bobby Scott);
see also Barkow, supra note 51, at 735 (same, and describing the public’s views as lacking
nuance, but not explicitly criticizing the public’s approach).
135
Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why?
The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237, 25455 (1997).
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The system seems opaque, tangled, insulated, and impervious to
outside scrutiny and change. Even though voters dislike plea
bargaining and revolving-door justice, it seems to happen all the time.
Recidivists, in particular, seem to be thumbing their noses at the law’s
authority and getting away with it.136 The solution may seem to be
bumper-sticker policies, which are clear and simple enough that
voters and prospective criminals can understand them.137 Clarity and
simplicity help to deter and express condemnation, two prominent
justifications for punishment.138 And by tying insiders’ hands, these
policies promise to produce consistency and make monitoring easier.
In short, voters may try to turn flexible, discretionary standards and
options into firm rules, in the hopes of binding insiders.

136

Julian L. Roberts, Public Opinion, Criminal Record, and the Sentencing Process, 39
SCIENTIST 488, 493 (1996), quoted in Tyler & Boeckmann, supra note 135, at 242.
137

Tom Tyler and Robert Boeckmann found that social values and fears about
social and moral cohesion are the dominant explanations for three dependent variables:
California’s three-strikes law, the public’s general punitiveness, and the public’s willingness
to abandon criminal procedural protections. Tyler & Boeckmann, supra note 135, at 253-55.
They also found significant, though smaller, correlations between judgments about crime and
the courts and the public’s support for general punitive policies (including mandatory
sentencing) and willingness to abandon criminal procedural protections (including
discontent with courts’ solicitude for defendants and technicalities and courts’ disregard for
ordinary citizens’ rights). Id. at 252. They speculated that the latter finding may rest on the
public’s judgment that current criminal procedures are unfair. Id. at 259. They found only
an insignificant correlation between judgments about crime and the courts and support for
California’s three-strikes law. Id. They found strong and significant correlations among all
three dependent variables (between .40 and .68 Pearson correlation coefficients). Id. at 250
tbl.1. They did not, however, test the causal pathways among these variables because they
treated all three as dependent variables. See id. at 253-54. Thus, frustration with and
willingness to abandon criminal procedures may partially explain California’s three-strikes
law; Tyler and Boeckmann did not test this hypothesis.
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See also infra text accompanying note 162 (noting that the criminal law tries to
serve these and other goals). But cf. supra text accompanying note 82 (noting that outsiders
care primarily about retribution or just deserts). The analysis in the text is particularly true
for neophyte and potential defendants, as well as the public at large. Repeat-player
defendants may be less deterrable (as evidenced by their track record) and more
knowledgeable about the system, though bumper-sticker policies may have an impact even
on them. When I was a prosecutor, I recall hearing about conversations in jail that
happened shortly after arrest and before much consultation with lawyers. These defendants
all seemed to know that one co-defendant’s status as a “three-time loser” meant that he
would go to prison for a very long time. Nevertheless, even recidivists frequently seemed to
misunderstand actual penalties.
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Step 5: Insiders Circumvent Even “Mandatory”
Reforms
Outsiders may pass mandatory bumper-sticker laws, but
insiders still get to enforce them. Because monitoring is difficult and
agency costs exert their pull, insiders find new ways to turn rules back
into discretionary options or standards. Sometimes they create or
exploit inevitable wiggle room in statutes and discretionary
procedures; at other times they simply flout the law. Either way,
insiders’ procedural powers trump, or at least soften, outsiders’
substantive and procedural strictures.
First, prosecutors do not always charge supposedly mandatory
crimes or penalties. Even under the mandatory California laws,
prosecutors can plea bargain by claiming that the evidence was
insufficient.139 Also, despite the three-strikes law’s ban on plea
bargaining, California judges and prosecutors strike or dismiss felony
counts or downgrade them to misdemeanors.140 In particular,
prosecutors have discretion to charge certain “wobbler” offenses as
either misdemeanors or felonies. Only the latter charges trigger the
three-strikes law, so prosecutors offer plea bargains that charge
misdemeanors instead.141 In other words, prosecutors turn threestrikes strictures into tools, using them to extract tougher but still
discounted plea bargains.142 One study tracked federal cases that
139

CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(f)(g) (West 1999) (banning plea bargaining or
dismissal of three-strikes allegations except for insufficiency of evidence or “in the
furtherance of justice”) ; id. § 1192.7(a) (banning plea bargaining or dismissal of serious
crimes charged in indictments or informations except for insufficiency of evidence,
unavailability of material witnesses, or where bargains would make no substantial difference
to sentences).
140

Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 THOMAS JEFFERSON L.
REV. 1, 24-25 (1998); Samara Marion, Justice by Geography: A Study of San Diego County’s
Three-Strikes Sentencing Practices from July-December 1996, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 29, 3536 (1999).
141

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4) (West 1999); Loren Gordon, Where to Commit
a Crime If You Can Only Spare a Few Days to Serve the Time: The Constitutionality of
California’s Wobbler Statutes As Applied in the State Today, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 497, 505-08
(2004).
142
See Marion, supra note 140, at 36; Joshua E. Bowers, Note, “The Integrity of the
Game Is Everything”: The Problem of Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 NYU L. REV.
1164, 1178 n.75 (2001) (collecting sources)
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initially included 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) gun charges, which carry
mandatory five-year consecutive sentences. In more than half of the
cases studied, a § 924(c) charge was later dropped. Prosecutors
seemed to be using these charge reductions to reward guilty pleas,
particularly fast guilty pleas.143 Another study found that in 40% of
cases in which drug mandatory minima would otherwise apply,
defendants pleaded guilty to lesser offenses. Whites and women were
more likely than minorities and men to avoid minima this way.144
Finally, while shall-arrest and no-drop policies may stiffen police and
prosecutors’ spines, the policies leave enough discretion that in
practice they are far from mandatory.145
Dropping charges creates a record that is at least potentially
open to oversight by supervisors or others. Thus, insiders also engage
in pre-charge bargaining. Before a grand jury indicts a case, the
insiders may agree to a plea to a lesser offense. For instance, defense
counsel may suggest a plea to using a telephone in the course of drug
trafficking instead of a substantive drug-trafficking offense. By doing
so, they cap the sentence at four years and avoid a minimum sentence
of five or ten years.146 Because the heavier charges are never filed,
supervisors and outsiders find it very difficult to detect the bargains.
Similarly, in the case of the California ban on plea bargaining, insiders
evaded the ban by striking bargains before indictment.147 And New
York prosecutors circumvented bargaining restrictions by offering
143

Celesta A. Albonetti, Empirical Evidence of Charge Bargaining in Federal Drug
and Gun Cases (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also United
States v. Angelos, 345 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah. 2004) (recounting that
prosecutors offered to let a defendant plead guilty to one § 924(c) gun charge, but, after the
defendant rejected the plea bargain, they penalized him by adding four more § 924(c) counts
in superseding indictments).
144

See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 66 tbl.10, 77 tbl.19, 80 tbl.22 (1991).
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See Hanna, supra note 96, at 1864; Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in
the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 854-55, 857 (1994) (collecting sources).
146
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A-B), 843(b), (d)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002);
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2484-85; see also Frank O.
Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining
Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1121-22 (2001) (noting that “such [phone
charges] are almost always Guidelines-evading plea bargains”).
147

MCCOY, supra note 131, at 97-104.
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misdemeanor pleas and allowing drug defendants to avoid
indictment.148
Finally, even after indictment, insiders undercut supposedly
mandatory sentences by using cooperation agreements. Cooperating
with police and prosecutors’ investigation unlocks otherwise
mandatory sentencing laws, providing one of the few ways to avoid
minimum sentences.149 When insiders are determined to strike
bargains, they can enter cooperation agreements despite thin
evidence of cooperation.150 Many judges gladly cooperate, using the
flimsy cooperation motion as an opportunity to reduce sentences.151
In some jurisdictions, stipulated-sentence plea agreements can
likewise evade mandatory guideline penalties.152

*****

The tale just told interweaves substantive and procedural
maneuvers and dissatisfactions. Low-visibility procedures such as
charge bargaining and declination frustrate outsiders both because
they seem procedurally unfair or dishonest and because they seem to
produce bad substantive outcomes. Outsiders respond by pushing for
new procedures, such as shall-arrest laws, plea-bargaining bans, and
sentencing guidelines, as well as new substantive crimes and
148

JOINT COMM. ON N.Y. DRUG LAW EVALUATION, THE NATION’S TOUGHEST
DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 27-28, 95 (1977).
149

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e)(2000 & Supp. 2002); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2003); ALA. CODE § 13A-12-232(b) (West 2004); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-18-409 (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-95(h)(5) (West
2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248.H2.5 (West 2005). The federal Guidelines, though not
mandatory minimum statutes nor state guidelines, have been rendered advisory and nonbinding by the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738,
764-68 (2005) (Breyer, J., remedial majority opinion).
150

See Ulmer, supra note 118, at 263-65 & tbl.1.

151

See id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Reflections on Departures from
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 6, 7 (1992) (suggesting the
same).
152
Though courts are split, a majority of federal courts let stipulated-sentence plea
agreements trump mandatory guideline provisions. See Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and
the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, supra note 123, at 305-06 & n.61.
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sentences. Insiders then use their procedural powers to subvert these
new procedures and substantive penalties. The traditional curricular
divorce of substantive criminal law from criminal procedure, however,
obscures this interplay.
The moral of the story is that outsiders cannot win enduring
victories. Outsiders lack the knowledge, the power, and the enduring
desire to keep monitoring low-visibility procedural decisions.
Politicians and the media play entrepreneurial roles,153 periodically
seizing on gripping (and sometimes unrepresentative) anecdotes to
excite popular outrage and pressure. But politicians simultaneously
cater to insider prosecutors, playing both sides of the insider-outsider
gulf. This dynamic is a tug-of-war or, more accurately, a spiral. If the
dynamic were a simple circle, we would wind up right back where we
started. But the spiral moves downward, taking a serious toll on
criminal justice, as the next Section explains.

B. The Costs of the Insider/Outsider Gulf and Spiral
We should not take too much solace in insiders’ ability to
soften the worst excesses of outsiders’ overreactions. The spiral
wastes prison resources by unduly lengthening some sentences. It
distracts public and legislative attention from other criminal justice
problems and reforms. It gives insiders vast power to apply the new
rules selectively to further their own interests or biases. This
unchecked discretion makes possible sentencing disparities that
disproportionately harm poor, male, and minority defendants.154 And
it is an ad hoc, low-visibility, not-very-accountable way to shape
policy in a democracy. It also has three other side effects. Subsection
1 discusses how the gulf clouds the substantive criminal law’s message
and efficacy. Subsection 2 explores how the gulf impairs trust in and
153

See supra text accompanying notes 56, 109 (explaining how the media fan the
public’s fears of crime); supra text accompanying notes 57, 107, 123 (explaining how
politicians exacerbate and exploit the public’s fears of crime); cf. Khanna, supra note 126, at
125-29 (discussing how politicians play to both the public and prosecutors in enacting
corporate-crime legislation).
154

See Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, supra note 119
(collecting sources).
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the legitimacy of the law. Subsection 3 assesses how the gulf obstructs
public preferences and monitoring of agency costs.

1.
Clouds the Law’s Substantive Message and
Effectiveness
The traditional Benthamite view holds that criminals commit
crimes because they gain more pleasure than pain from them. The
purpose of the criminal law is to deter this and other criminals by
making the expected punishment for the crime exceed the expected
benefit.155 Thus, the law must be clear and straightforward enough
that prospective criminals will understand the expected
punishment.156 But criminal procedure’s opacity and unpredictability
undercuts this aim of the substantive criminal law. If the expected
punishment is unknown, it may not deter the potential or neophyte
criminal. Even if some recidivists know expected sentences, first- and
second-time offenders and potential offenders do not. This
misunderstanding is especially likely because criminals are
overoptimistic and prone to underestimate and take risks. Thus, in
the face of criminal procedure’s opacity and complexity, neophytes are
likely to underestimate expected sentences and to take chances on
not being punished heavily.157
Substantive criminal law also seeks to inculcate and reinforce
social and moral norms. By threatening and inflicting proportionate
punishment, the law proclaims the badness of the crime and
vindicates the victim’s worth.158 It can thus help to heal victims. It
155
See JEREMY BENTHAM , AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 170 n.1, 179-80 (Clarendon Press 1879) (new corrected ed. 1823).
156

Bentham’s desire to communicate a deterrent message helps to explain his
obsession with codification, as a way of making the law rational and clear.
157

See Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 5, at 2498-2502,
2507-10. These and other problems impede deterrence in the real world. See Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, Does the Criminal Law Deter? A Social Science Investigation, 24
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD . 173 (2004); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of
Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO.
L.J.949, 953-56 (2003).
158

See Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT:
(continued...)
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also expresses the community’s condemnation and, by doing so,
reaffirms society’s teachings.159 For criminal punishment to
communicate consistently and effectively, criminal procedure must be
transparent. Otherwise, current and prospective criminals, victims,
and the public do not see justice done nor hear its message.160 But,
as Section I.C explained, criminal justice is far from transparent to
outsiders. In particular, victims have lost their day in court and do
not see justice done, so they feel frustrated and long for vindication
and healing.161 In sum, criminal procedure’s shortcomings obstruct
the substantive criminal law’s goals of deterring, educating,
vindicating victims, and expressing condemnation.162
In recent years, scholars and the public have shown renewed
interest in publicly shaming convicted criminals as ways of expressing
condemnation of crimes.163 One point, however, often gets lost in the
shaming-punishment debate. Shaming punishments are expressively
satisfying precisely because the rest of criminal justice seems opaque.
While other punishments seem uncertain, cloaked in the fog of parole
and jargon, and hidden behind prison walls, shaming punishments
communicate brashly and unequivocally. They have clear meaning
158
(...continued)
A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER 112, 116-21 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995);
Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON , FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 111, 124-32 (1988).
159

There are several variants of this idea. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
95, 101-05 (1970); 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 80-82 (1996) (1883); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in
RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 20-22 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992). The most prominent
recent advocate of this view is Dan Kahan. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593, 597-601 (1996).
160

See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1138-63 (2000). In
addition, outsiders will not respect the criminal law’s message if they do not see the law as
procedurally fair and legitimate. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
161

See Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure:
The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, supra note 11, at 1406-07; Bibas &
Bierschbach, supra note 11, at 136.
162

See also supra text accompanying note 138 (discussing how the criminal law
seeks to deter and express condemnation). But cf. supra text accompanying note 82 (noting
that outsiders care primarily about retribution or just deserts).
163

The leading proponent of shaming punishments is Dan Kahan. For Kahan’s
seminal work in the area, see Kahan, supra note 159.
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and visible bite.164 Perhaps one reason voters clamor for shaming
punishments is that they are about the only ways outsiders can see
justice being done.165 If criminal procedure were not so opaque, we
might have less need and demand for such humiliating
punishments.166

2. Impairs Legitimacy and Trust
People respect the law more when it is visibly fair and they
have some voice or control over its procedures. Procedural fairness,
process control, and trust in insider’s motives contribute greatly to
criminal justice’s legitimacy.167 Individual experiences with an
insider’s procedural fairness and trustworthy motives spill over into
broader attitudes about the criminal justice system’s legitimacy. As
Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo explain, “people generalize from their
personal experiences with police officers and judges to form their
broader views about the law and about their community.”168
Increased legitimacy increases compliance with the law. Most citizens
obey the law not only because they fear punishment, but because the
law seems fair and therefore legitimate.169 Conversely, perceived
164

See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 159, at 593, 630-37 (1996).

165

Cf. James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1089-92 (1998) (condemning “shaming as a form of lynch justice” because it stirs
up and plays on mob passions).
166
For criticisms of shaming punishments as cruel and humiliating, see, e.g.,
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 82-83 (1993); Stephen P. Garvey, Can
Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 759 (1998); Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1942-43 (1991).
167

See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN , EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 77-78 (1970) (noting that people who feel
they have a voice in an organization tend to develop affection and loyalty for the
organization); LIND & TYLER, supra note 75, at 106, 208, 215 (“Procedures are viewed as
fairer when they vest process control or voice in those affected by a decision”); TYLER, supra
note 75, at 94-108, 125-34, 146-47, 161-70, 178; TOM R. TYLER &YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN
THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 101-38
(2002).
168
169

TYLER & HUO, supra note 167, at 136.

See id. at 101-38; LIND & TYLER, supra note 75, at 76-81; TYLER, supra note 75,
at 161-70, 178; see also Fred W. Friendly, On Judging the Judges, in STATE COURTS: A
(continued...)
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unfairness or lack of trust can erode the system’s legitimacy and
compliance.
Just as citizens must see the criminal law to be procedurally
fair, so they must also see substantive justice being done. When
citizens see that the law reaches substantively just outcomes, the law
earns moral credibility that persuades citizens to obey the law in other
cases.170 Conversely, when the law reaches outcomes that are
substantively unjust, or at least not visibly just, citizens view the law’s
judgments as less credible and less worthy of respect.171 The likely
result, as Janice Nadler’s empirical work suggests, is decreased respect
for and compliance with the criminal law.172
At one time, public jury trials not only educated ordinary
citizens and let them see and influence justice being done, but also
contributed to the law’s democratic legitimacy.173 But today,
outsiders neither see nor understand nor participate much in criminal
justice. The system is too opaque and remote to educate them well.
They lack much of a voice, a stake, or a sense of inclusion. Moreover,
many criminal-justice decisions result from secret or low-visibility
exercises of discretion and are not constrained by any rules or
standards.174 Citizens see very little of the system’s workings, except
when politicians or the media expose some outrageous anecdote, so
they cannot see fair procedures at work. This secrecy and opacity

169
(...continued)
BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE 70, 72 (Theodore J. Fetter ed., 1978) (“[A] public that is
cynical or ignorant about its laws is a lawless one.”).
170
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 474-48.
171

Id. at 483-85, 488.
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Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1410-26 (2005) (finding
that survey subjects who read stories of unjust laws were later more willing to violate
unrelated laws, and that survey subjects who read accounts of an unjust criminal outcome
were later more willing to nullify the law as jurors in an unrelated criminal case); see
Robinson & Darley, supra note 170, at 457, 485.
173

See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 271-76 (vol I, pt. 2, ch. 8); Amar, supra note
14, at 1182-89; supra Section I.A (discussing the public, democratic, populist, participatory
character of colonial American justice).
174

See supra note 1.

42

New York University Law Review [Vol. 86: p.xxx

weakens citizens’ trust in the law175 and may also make them feel
distant and alienated. The secrecy and opacity also mean that
citizens do not see run-of-the-mill substantively just results. Instead,
they see only the aberrantly harsh or lenient sentences that the media
highlight. These visible injustices undermines the law’s substantive
moral credibility.
Perhaps because of these factors, nearly three-quarters of
Americans lack great confidence and trust in the criminal justice
system.176 Two-thirds of Americans see plea bargaining, the most
opaque and insider-dominated part of the system, as problematic.177
Victims have similar reactions. Victims in states with weak victims’rights laws are much less likely to receive notice and participate
meaningfully in various stages of the criminal process.178 Thus, they
are more likely to come away dissatisfied and doubt the criminal
justice system’s fairness and thoroughness.179 In short, criminal
procedure’s failings undercut the substantive criminal law’s efficacy
and goals.
3. Impairs Public Preferences and Monitoring
Another reason for the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
public jury trials was to make criminal justice “fundamentally populist

175

For a powerful argument to this effect in the context of police and prosecutorial
discretion, see Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 160, at 1156-63; see also AMY
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 95-101 (1996)
(explaining that publicity of information and government officials’ reasons for actions not
only “help[s to] sustain a sense of legitimacy,” but also promotes democratic deliberation).
176

See Lydia Saad, Military Again Tops “Confidence in Institutions” List, GALLUP
N E W S
S E R V . ,
J u n e
1 ,
2 0 0 5 ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/?ci=16555&pg=1 (last visited July 11, 2005) (reporting
that only 9% of poll respondents had “a great deal” of confidence in the American criminal
justice system and an additional 17% had “quite a lot” of confidence in it). Of the fifteen
institutions mentioned in the survey, only four ranked below the criminal justice system:
organized labor, Congress, big business, and health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Id.
177
See Myers, supra note 122, at 54-55 & tbl.4.2; Robert F. Rich & Robert J.
Sampson, Public Perceptions of Criminal Justice Policy: Does Victimization Make a Difference?,
5 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 109, 114 (1990).
178
NAT’L VICTIM CENTER, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT ON CRIME VICTIMS 31-38 (1996)
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Id. at 43-46, 51-63.
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and majoritarian.”180 In a related vein, grand juries used to publicize
prosecutorial declinations and other hidden executive actions, which
increased accountability and checked agency costs.181 In other words,
transparency and participation kept criminal justice in line with the
public’s sense of justice. Now that juries are an endangered species,
however, criminal justice is opaque and dominated by insiders. These
barriers obstruct outsiders’ ability to monitor insiders and to influence
them. Insiders have more room to indulge their self-interests in
lenient, hurried dispositions. Thus, agency costs warp processes and
substantive outcomes, causing them to diverge at times from the
public’s sense of justice.
Because of these barriers, outsiders can intervene only crudely.
Citizens and victims cannot influence individual cases, so at best they
can paint with a broad brush by voting and influencing legislatures.
At worst, they must resort to ballot initiatives, such as three-strikes
laws and mandatory minima, because they have lost faith in insiders
and lack subtler tools. What should have been a cooperative
relationship has degenerated into a competitive one, as outsiders
wield these sledgehammers and insiders feel it necessary to evade
these crude blows.

III. Partial Solutions
One is tempted to start reforming by empowering outsiders to
help write a new set of laws and rules to check insiders. As Section
II.A has shown, that enterprise is doomed to failure. In practice,
insiders find ways to evade supposedly mandatory laws or twist them
into plea-bargaining clubs. Rather, to monitor and check insiders, we
must better inform outsiders and provide more ways for them to
participate day-to-day. My aim is to translate the transparency,
clarity, and participation of eighteenth-century village justice into the
twenty-first century. Better information would create better electoral
checks and better understanding of and respect for the process. More
day-to-day participation would supervise the application of law to
180

Amar, supra note 14, at 1185.

181

Id. at 1184.
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individual cases, much as juries once did. Participation would both
improve the process and educate outsiders, though the latter is harder
to do.
In other words, reforms should pursue two goals
simultaneously. First, they should strive to reduce the negative
procedural side effects of our secretive criminal process. These
include outsider cynicism, frustration, and loss of faith and trust.
Second, they should use transparency, participation, and monitoring
to achieve better substantive outcomes. A transparent and
participatory system would better heal and vindicate victims and
encourage more to come forward. It would reduce agency costs and
reduce reliance on bumper-sticker policies. And it could align arrest,
charging, plea, and sentencing patterns more closely with public
preferences.
A note of pessimism is in order. We are not about to abandon
the twenty-first-century world of guilty pleas and return to the
eighteenth century any time soon. Nor can better information return
us all the way to the small eighteenth-century villages where little
could remain hidden or private. As long as professionals run criminal
justice, there will be a significant gap of information, participation,
and desires between insiders and outsiders. Politicians and the media
will continue to exploit and exacerbate the gap, and sound-bite
policy-making will continue to work. Nevertheless, reforms could at
least improve the current dismal state of affairs, creating more
community knowledge, involvement, and oversight.
My proposed solutions try to influence three primary groups:
1) victims, by giving them information and participatory rights;
2) members of the public, by giving them information and
participatory rights; and 3) insider prosecutors, police, and judges, by
using outsiders’ information and participation to check insiders’
agency costs and perspective. The former two groups gain important
substantive as well as procedural benefits from transparency and
participation.182 The latter need oversight to better align their

182

See supra Subsections II.B.1-2.
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substantive policies with public preferences.183 There is good reason
for optimism about victims and pessimism about the public; the
prognosis for insiders is somewhere in between.

A. Informing and Empowering Victims
1. Victim Information
Informing victims about their cases should be relatively easy.
Victims are a discrete, identifiable group with whom police and often
prosecutors must make contact in any event.184 As noted, while most
states have some form of victims’ rights law on the books,
enforcement is uneven and many victims fail to receive notice.185
States should redouble their efforts to provide timely advance notice
of all key stages, from arrest through charging to plea and sentence.
A dedicated official, such as a victim/witness coordinator, can help to
increase contact with victims and keep tabs on the progress of cases.
Now, with the advent of e-mail, notifying victims and defendants is
even easier. The district attorney’s or clerk of the court’s computer
system should e-mail automated updates every time an arraignment,
bail, plea, trial, or sentencing hearing is scheduled or rescheduled and
again two days before the hearing. For victims or defendants without
e-mail access, an automated telephone reminder system could do the
same job. Including directions to the courthouse and courtroom and
contact telephone numbers would make it easier for victims to attend
and see justice done. E-mails after each hearing could summarize
what happened at each stage. While notifying crime victims will take
work, time, and resources, this price is worth paying to increase victim
information, satisfaction, and healing.186
2. Victim Participation
183

See supra Subsection II.B.3.

184

My claim is most true of direct victims of personal and property crimes. Many
others suffer indirectly from these and drug crimes, and these broader groups are harder to
identify and track down.
185
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See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

Cf. supra text accompanying note 161 (discussing how the gulf between insiders
and outsiders obstructs the substantive goals of victim vindication, healing, and catharsis).
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Empowering victims is a bit harder but still manageable.
There will always be some participation gap between insiders and
victims, because victims are not about to supplant prosecutors. As
long as victims are not in charge, police, prosecutors, and judges will
make some decisions that dismay them. But, “although victims’
desire is to be included in the criminal justice process, they have no
desire to take control . . . of the case.”187 Interestingly, most victims
are not angry and vengeful and do not demand harsher
punishments.188 As noted earlier, simple participation helps to
empower and heal victims.189 Participants see the law as more fair
and legitimate when they have some control over the process and feel
they have been heard, whether or not they control ultimate
outcomes.190 A participatory role and fair and respectful treatment
would go a long way toward addressing victims’ grievances, regardless
of the outcomes.191 In short, criminal justice can make victims better
off by better informing and including them. The same is probably true
of crime bystanders and locals who live near the crime scene, though
it would be logistically harder to identify and include a representative
sample.
There are many ways to increase victims’ participation. As
Richard Bierschbach and I have argued elsewhere, victim-offender
mediation makes both parties better off when both are willing to take
part.192 Victims who participate in mediation are more likely to
believe that the system is fair, that their cases were handled
satisfactorily, that they got to tell their stories, that the system
considered their opinions, that the outcome was satisfactory, and that
187
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the offender was accountable.193 They are also more likely to receive
apologies and to forgive and less likely to fear revictimization or to
stay upset.194
Victims could participate in other ways as well. At a
minimum, they could allocute orally at sentencing, instead of simply
submitting perfunctory written victim-impact statements. They could
also speak with, question, and respond to defendants and lawyers at
trials and plea and sentencing hearings.195 Prosecutors could be
required to consult with victims before dropping charges, entering
into plea bargains, or recommending sentences. This and other forms
of participation would speed victims’ emotional healing and combat
their feelings of powerlessness and alienation.196
Increased participation carries costs. Victim information and
participation cost time and money, may slow some cases down, and
constrain prosecutors’ flexibility. Defendants’ speedy trial rights limit
how much victims can be permitted to slow down cases. But these
costs may well be worth paying. Criminal justice is not simply an
assembly line that should maximize speed and quantity and minimize
cost, though those are important considerations. Just as society
spends money to promote accident victims’ physical healing, it should
support and fund crime victims’ emotional healing through
transparent, participatory criminal procedure.197 These substantive
goals may well be worth some sacrifice in procedural efficiency.
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B. Increasing Public Information and Participation
1. Public Information
As Section I.C explained, though outsiders think they
understand criminal justice, in fact they suffer from poor and
misleading information. To remedy this problem, the government
could publicize accurate statistics about average sentences and
average time actually served for murder, manslaughter, rape,
kidnapping, robbery, assault, arson, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.
Arrest statistics could indicate the percentage of reported crimes in
each category that result in arrests and the percentage that result in
convictions for that crime. Statistics could also report the percentage
of arrests that result in charges and the percentage of charges that
result in charge reductions, acquittals, or dismissals. Each of these
statistics could be broken down by prosecutorial or police district.
These statistics would not cost much more to compile than those
already compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
A little clear, simple, accurate information could go a long
way. As I have noted, citizens call for tougher sentencing laws
because they systematically underestimate average nominal
sentences.198 Correcting that misimpression alone would greatly
alleviate the downward spiral. Moreover, what little information is
out there is sometimes misleading. As mentioned earlier, conviction
rates mislead the public by concealing charge reductions.199 Few good
sentencing statistics are published, let alone publicized.200 The best
way to counteract misleading information is with more and better
information. Statistics on charge reductions and dismissals would
round out the picture, showing that prosecutors have been bringing
many marginal cases but then bargaining them away leniently.
Disseminating this information is an effort to approximate the
villages of two centuries ago, when everyone would have known and
198
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seen the crimes, charges, verdicts, and punishments. Unfortunately,
spreading better information among the general public is not easy to
do. Insiders have vested interests in avoiding this scrutiny, and they
may overreact in trying to shield themselves from criticism. As noted
earlier, insiders may misreport data or distort statistics to paint rosy
pictures of their own performance.201 Also, it can be difficult and
costly to publicize the facts in our cacophonous society. The public
tends to react to television sound bites. The media and politicians
have every incentive to play to this tendency, emphasizing gripping
stories at the expense of dull statistics and policies. Vivid and
troubling stories sell newspapers, attract viewers, and win votes. The
availability heuristic causes people to over-generalize from salient and
memorable anecdotes.202 Conversely, people give too little weight to
abstract statistical information.203 What the public really needs to see
are not statistics, but flesh-and-blood typical defendants facing typical
sentences. But in our non-participatory system, that is not about to
happen.
Electoral candidates can do much of the work of bringing
statistics to voters’ attention. In the status quo, incumbent district
attorneys simply brag about astronomical conviction rates or cherrypick juicy anecdotes. But if government offices published more good
data, challengers could stress high rates of charge reductions and
deflated sentences in their campaign advertisements. As noted
earlier, data gathering in New Orleans has gone hand-in-hand with
this kind of change in district attorney election rhetoric, and voters
there have taken note.204 Better statistics would help electoral rivals
to fight statistics with statistics, painting a somewhat more balanced
picture. The prognosis, however, is not bright, because anecdotes
201
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tend to trump dry statistics.
Other, more limited reforms are more likely to succeed. For
example, some types of plea bargaining are particularly opaque. As
Wright and Miller argue, charge bargaining and fact bargaining are
more opaque and dishonest than trials, pleas without agreements, and
sentence bargains.205 Charge and fact bargains lie about the crime
that actually happened and the facts surrounding it, breeding public
cynicism. Historically, prosecutors have discouraged sentence
bargaining more than charge bargaining, but this focus is
backwards.206 Though plea bargaining will persist for the foreseeable
future, judges and head prosecutors can at least clamp down on
charge and fact bargaining. Turning these bargains into sentence
bargains or open pleas will make them more honest, transparent, and
accessible to public scrutiny.207 The public may thus regain some faith
in the criminal justice system and view its message as more legitimate
and worthy of obedience.208
One might also consider publishing prosecutors’ procedural
and substantive policies governing plea bargaining and sentencing.209
A few prosecutors’ offices have already done so.210 Repeat defense
counsel already know the going rates for particular crimes.211
Providing this information would level the playing field for novice
defense counsel, inform the public somewhat, and discipline
205
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prosecutors.212 Because certainty of punishment, rather than severity,
is the main factor in deterring criminals,213 plea and sentencing
policies would not encourage prospective criminals much. If
anything, clearer information would reduce the room for potential
criminals to optimistically underestimate their likely sentences and so
gamble on going to trial.214 Besides, recidivist offenders may know the
going rates anyway.
One might fear that publishing substantive sentencing policies
and statistics could backfire, because the public might conclude that
penalties need to be stiffer. If the public is innately and unalterably
hostile to criminal defendants, then bringing any information to its
attention might lead to more pressure to raise sentences. But, as
argued earlier, this knee-jerk response is an artifact of the spiral, not
an unalterable fact. The public calls for raising sentences because it
systematically underestimates actual average penalties.215 The
average voter, if fully informed, would think that nominal penalties
are high enough and that further raising them would be costly and
pointless.216 One cannot be certain, but transparency might refocus
voters away from raising overall sentences and toward scrutinizing
prosecutors’ disparate plea-bargaining practices. Moreover, in a
democracy voters have the right to know about and influence these
issues. Regardless of their own policy preferences, insider elites owe
it to voters to try to work with and inform them instead of keeping
them in the dark.
Transparency could also illuminate policing. As Erik Luna has
argued, public administrative rulemaking could develop rules or
standards to guide the use of force, vice enforcement patterns, and
212
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other practices.217 Collaborative, open decisionmaking, such as some
community-policing methods, can reflect neighborhood priorities and
accommodate outsiders’ concerns.218 Better police recruitment,
training, performance standards, oversight, and discipline can likewise
check police actions that could breed antagonism and mistrust.219
More open community review boards could restore public trust in the
police.220 Videotaping police interrogations and searches, and
mandatory record-keeping, could improve monitoring and
credibility.221 Sharing crime maps with the community could facilitate
reciprocal sharing of information. Information sharing also helps to
explain police resource allocation decisions to minority neighborhoods
and lets neighborhoods respond with their concerns. This
transparency may thus allay minority fears that police targeting
decisions are racially biased.222
In short, public information and transparency are unlikely to
work wonders at the federal and state levels. Voters are too poorly
informed, statistics are too dry, and unrepresentative anecdotes are
too prevalent in media accounts to bode well for better public
understanding overall. But, at the neighborhood level, transparency
may well help local residents and local police to better understand
and perhaps better trust each other. As a result, the substantive
criminal law might communicate its message more effectively and
command more respect and obedience.223
2. Public Participation
Perhaps members of the general public could participate more
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actively as well. Though they rarely serve on petit juries, they could
sit on newly created plea juries and sentencing juries to review pleas
and sentences in the most serious cases.224 Perhaps more realistically,
citizens could serve for two weeks at a time as citizen advocates
within prosecutors’ offices, consulting on proposed felony charges and
dispositions.225
This rotation would ensure widespread lay
participation and avoid jadedness, much as the Founders thought
juries an important way to rotate citizens through government
service.226 These citizens would need to swear to secrecy, just as
grand and petit jurors must swear to secrecy. Citizens would grumble
about this service, just as they grumble about and try to wiggle out of
jury duty. But just as jurors often come away impressed with the
system,227 these citizens would learn from their experience and might
develop more respect for it. As noted earlier, giving citizens a voice
in criminal justice procedures can increase the system’s legitimacy and
respect in their eyes.228 Citizens would also see the law at work ex post
in individual cases. As a result, they might better appreciate charging
and sentencing variations than they would have when considering
hypothetical or atypical cases ex ante.
Outsiders could also consult with police about proposed
community-policing tactics and priorities. These tactics may include
curfews, gang-loitering laws, anti-nuisance injunctions, and ordermaintenance policing. As Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan have
argued, these approaches enjoy much greater democratic legitimacy
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when adopted in consultation with community members.229 This
consultation and legitimacy may reassure members of minority groups,
who have historically mistrusted law enforcement. In addition, police
tactics are far more likely to succeed with community support.230
Unfortunately, many of these proposals would be difficult to
implement on a large scale. Now that grand and petit juries are
rarities, it is hard to re-create their role effectively. Plea and
sentencing juries would likely prove too cumbersome to replicate
widely in our efficiency-obsessed assembly-line system.231 Citizen
advocates who rotated through police and prosecutors’ offices and
courts for a few weeks would probably lack enough expertise and
knowledge of cases to serve as effective voices. Any new roles for
citizens would cost much time and money, further straining our cashstrapped criminal justice system.
In addition, twenty-first-century society is much larger, more
anonymous, and more distant than eighteenth-century villages were.
No more than a small percentage of citizens would rotate through
these positions or consult with police departments in any given year.
Suburbs are so insular and far-flung that many residents do not even
know their neighbors, let alone gossip with them about their quasijury service. Thus, it would not be easy to diffuse the Tocquevillean
educative benefits of jury service through more than a small fraction
of the populace. Only a minority of voters would see particular cases
up close and ex post. As a result, most voters would remain amenable
to politicians’ anti-crime appeals and ex ante referenda such as threestrikes laws. The prognosis for major improvements in public
information and participation, in short, is not great. Meaningful
reform would be difficult, but not impossible.
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C. Checking Agency Costs and Insiders’ Perspectives
The previous two Subsections discussed the benefits of
information and participation for outsiders. But information and
participation simultaneously help to check insiders’ self-interests,
agency costs, and pragmatic perspectives and preferences.232 Victims,
rotating citizen advocates, or plea and sentencing juries would serve
many of the functions that grand and petit juries once did, by
checking executive and judicial conduct. They could review
proposed enforcement priorities, indictments, plea agreements, and
sentence recommendations, just as many police and prosecutorial
supervisors now do. Police would have to explain apparently
discriminatory patterns of traffic stops, frisks, and arrests. Prosecutors
would have to explain to victims and citizens why they needed to
decline prosecution, drop particular charges, strike charge bargains,
or agree to low sentences. Judges would face similar scrutiny.
I do not suggest that victims or ordinary citizens should
receive vetoes over these decisions.233 Simply giving them voices
would force insiders to reckon with outsiders’ perspectives, needs, and
desires. Having to articulate reasons for decision, even orally and
briefly, would discipline prosecutors, much as having to write a
reasoned opinion disciplines judges. Faced with real live victims or
concerned citizens, prosecutors might find it harder to indulge their
risk aversion or sloth. Likewise, judges might be more reluctant to
rubber-stamp plea agreements.
In practice, as the previous Subsection explained, general
public participation is unlikely to serve as much of a check on insiders’
self-interests and jadedness. Lay judges in Germany, for example,
routinely defer to the professional judges with whom they sit and have
almost no influence.234 Greater transparency and public information,
however, is more likely to discipline elected insiders. Even if they are
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uncertain how many people are paying attention, insiders may fear
that an electoral opponent will seize on this information, swaying
swing voters at the next election. In other words, they have reason
to err on the side of caution.
One way to increase transparency and check insiders is to
publishing arrest and charge declination policies. This solution,
however, is problematic. As Meir Dan-Cohen famously put it, much
of the criminal law operates on an “acoustic separation” between
“conduct rules” and “decision rules.”235 For example, the criminal law
forbids all stealing, but in practice police arrest and prosecutors
prosecute only thieves who steal, say, $40 or more. Outsiders tend to
know only the conduct rules, but insiders know the decision rules as
well.236 Publishing these decision rules would increase police and
prosecutorial accountability at the expense of encouraging crimes
below the threshold.
Other charging policies, such as procedural protocols and
limits on adding and dropping charges, would be less susceptible to
this critique. Policies that did not proclaim effective immunity for
certain crimes, but simply regulated procedures for pending cases,
would be less likely to undercut deterrence. For example, prosecutors
could have to document and explain why they initially charged a case
as murder but later downgraded it to manslaughter. Transparent
guidelines would better enable voters and the press to check
prosecutors and, in particular, opaque charge bargaining.237 Criminal
code reform could also make the definitions of crimes more
transparent and so facilitate voters’ and legislators’ oversight of
charging.238
Transparency would also improve policing. Many jurisdictions
235
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do not even keep data on police shootings.239 Laws should require
this data collection, record-keeping, and publication, much as they
now do the same for traffic stops to expose racial profiling.240 Citizen
review boards could then publicize these data and pressure errant
police departments to change.241 (One could create comparable
citizen review boards to oversee prosecutors’ offices and publicize
data.) As Bill Stuntz argues persuasively, these optimistic-sounding
transparent solutions are likely to work, just as disclosures effectively
reduce lending discrimination and pollution.242
Another possibility is to create administrative agencies to
oversee certain sectors of criminal justice. As Rachel Barkow has
explained, the politically insulated U.S. Sentencing Commission has
been a failure. But transparent, participatory state sentencing
commissions have successfully regulated insider sentencing discretion
by being responsive to political interests and by disseminating
sentencing information.243 Perhaps similar agencies could regulate
and make transparent other insider decisions, such as diversion and
police tactics.244 New agencies cost money, but a modest investment
might be worth the cost.
The most potent disciplining force is likely to be victims.
Victims, and to a lesser extent affected locals, are a discrete,
identifiable group who already know about their crimes and are
motivated to take part. Because of their background knowledge, they
do not need to be brought up to speed, can speak with authority, and
will not automatically defer to insiders’ assessments. They also have
palpable stakes in the process and outcomes, which can
counterbalance insiders’ own stakes and preferences. And precisely
because they are not repeat players, they can counteract the jading or
239
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mellowing that affects insiders as well as their emphasis on pragmatic
concerns. At the same time, victims and locals will see some practical
constraints and aggravating and mitigating factors ex post, helping
them to understand outcomes better. In short, insiders will have to
address outsiders’ moralism, and outsiders will have to see insiders’ ex
post perspective and pragmatism. Though they will not always see eye
to eye, the perspectives of the two sides may converge.245

CONCLUSION
The gulf between insiders and outsiders grows out of the
professionalization of criminal justice over the last two to three
centuries. Understanding it helps us to make sense of many otherwise
puzzling or frustrating features of criminal justice. For example, it
explains why insiders still use Alford and nolo contendere pleas to
dispose of cases efficiently, even though outsiders may be deeply
suspicious of them.246 Pundits write about politicians and the public’s
vengefulness in passing three-strikes laws and mandatory minima.247
Scholars have long criticized plea bargaining ad nauseam and called
for banning it. But unless one explores outsiders’ frustrations and
insiders’ incentives and circumvention methods, one cannot truly
245
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appreciate these problems, let alone find realistic solutions to them.
This survey also underscores the need to reform the structure
of criminal justice to improve democratic legitimacy, transparency,
popular participation, and monitoring of agency costs. As Rachel
Barkow has argued, criminal procedure has been too slow to
incorporate these and other insights from political science, agency
theory, and administrative law.248 Simply passing a ban on plea
bargaining, for example, will probably do little lasting good because
insiders evade paper rules. A checks-and-balances approach to
criminal justice is likely to prove more effective in the long run.
Where do we go from here? The next logical target of
scrutiny is penology and the prison system. As Foucault notes,
punishment used to be a public spectacle but is now hidden away
behind high prison walls, accessible only to prison guards.249 This
privacy seems more humane than whipping and the stocks, as it spares
prisoners public humiliation. But, at the same time, it keeps the
public from seeing justice done. This hiddenness mutes criminal
justice’s expression of condemnation, and the only way to amplify this
muted message seems to be to keep raising the number of years. The
public only dimly understands who the average prisoner is, how
effectively prison punishes and deters, and how cost-effective it is to
spend $40,000 per year on a prison cell. As a result, voters may
ratchet up sentences ex ante, across the board, without appreciating
the likely costs and benefits ex post in particular cases. Dangerous
criminals, such as violent and serious drug felons, would need lengthy
incapacitation under any system. But, in a more transparent and
participatory regime, the public might prefer other punishments for
many inmates who are less dangerous.
Transparency and
participation could reshape the politics of punishment and the search
for alternative sanctions that are shorter, more memorable, more
expressively satisfying, and less costly.
If outsiders have “eaten on the insane root / That takes the
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reason prisoner,” it is not their fault.250 Outsiders call for ever-higher
penalties and rigid laws not because they are sadistic, but because our
criminal justice system is opaque, insular, and unresponsive. The
barriers to reform are formidable: suburban anonymity, crimesaturated media, and assembly-line efficiency separate us from the
eighteenth-century world of small villages. While we cannot return
to the colonial justice system, we can better incorporate its values of
transparency, participation, and accountability. Now that we have
moved from the jury box to the plea-bargaining table, we must find
other ways to include victims and ordinary citizens in our
participatory democracy. Otherwise, the spiral downward will
continue to erode the system’s efficacy, fairness, and legitimacy.
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